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THE CRIMEAN CRISIS
R.J. DELAHUNTY
Russia's armed intervention in Crimea late last winter, the purported
secession of Crimea from Ukraine, and the ensuing Russian annexation of
Crimea are events that ought to be of keen interest to students of
international law. The world witnessed the forcible seizure of part of an
established European state and the redrawing of its international
boundaries-events that call into question the continuing viability of the
"Long Peace" that has characterized European affairs since the end of the
Second World War. Yet the international institutions created since 1945 to
maintain or restore peace or to criminalize and punish aggression proved
worthless in dealing with the Crimean Crisis. This essay argues that
Russia's infractions of contemporary international use-of-force rules were
clear; that Russia's legal defenses were unconvincing; that both the
secession and subsequent annexation of Crimea were unlawful; but that
even the mature and developed body of international law intended to
address situations like this provide neither prevention nor significant relief
The Crimean Crisis came and went in the blink of an eye. And already
it seems as if the issue has been forgotten. Few outside Ukraine would now
consider challenging Russia's absorption of Crimea. Some go so far as to
blame the United States (U.S.), the European Union (E.U.), and the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) for Russia's armed intervention.'
And even though Russia has compounded its aggressiveness, for instance
by providing assistance to the Ukrainian separatists who shot down a
Malaysia Airlines passenger aircraft last July causing 298 deaths,2 the
1. See John J. Mearsheimer, Why the Ukraine Crisis is the West's Fault, FOREIGN AFFAIRS
(September/October 2014), available at http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/141769/john-j-
mearsheimer/why-the-ukraine-crisis-is-the-wests-fault. For a rebuttal, see Alexander Motyl, The
Ukraine Crisis According to John J. Mearsheimer: Impeccable Logic, Wrong Facts in European
Leadership Network (Oct. 31, 2014),http://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/the-ukraine-
crisis-according-to-john-j-mearsheimer-impeccable-logic-wrong-facts_2079.html.
2. See Peter Baker, Michael R. Gordon & Mark Mazzetti, U.S. Sees Evidence of Russian
Links to Jet's Downing, THE N.Y. TIMES (July 18, 2014), available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/19/world/europe/malaysia-airlines-plane-ukraine.html.
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international community has done little to punish Russia for its actions in
Crimea or elsewhere in Ukraine.3 This indifference may be due to the sense
that a belated challenge would be either futile or dangerous; to the aversion
on the West's part to the renewal of the Cold War; to Ukraine's relatively
unimportant place in the global economy and its perceived strategic
unimportance to the U.S.; to the belief that Crimea is, in some sense,
legitimately part of Russia; to the vote in the Crimean referendum in favor
of unification with Russia; to more pressing matters like ISIS; to the desire
to avoid driving Russia and China even closer together; or to some
combination of these factors. Yet the Crimean Crisis of February and
March 2014 should hold our attention and cause us concern. The world
witnessed the forcible seizure of part of an established State-a State,
moreover, that was a founding member of the United Nations-and the
redrawing of its international boundaries. Other than in Kosovo, no similar
episode has occurred in post-1945 Europe.
Furthermore, Russia's continuing encroachment on Ukraine threatens to
change the strategic situation in Europe in fundamental ways. Former
National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski wrote in 1998 that,
"Ukraine, a new and important space on the Eurasian chessboard, is a
geopolitical pivot because its very existence as an independent country
helps to transform Russia. Without Ukraine, Russia ceases to be a Eurasian
empire."' Ukraine, if only because it is a kind of "buffer State" between
Russia and the E.U. (rather as Germany was in the Cold War), is at risk of
being overrun by a more powerful neighbor. Unless it is neutralized (and
perhaps not even then) a Ukraine that the West will not defend and that
lacks the means to defend itself will be a likely prey to further Russian
aggression-with unpredictable consequences for international peace. We
should not forget that, not very long ago, Ukraine fell squarely within the
"Bloodlands" of Europe. 6
Students both of international law and of international relations have
long been, and ought to remain, deeply occupied with the question of how
to construct international institutions that will maintain or restore peace and
punish acts of aggression.' For them, the Crimean Crisis raises two,
3. For a different view of the scale and effectiveness of Western sanctions, see Joe Biden,
Remarks by the Vice-President at the Kennedy Forum (Oct. 3, 2014) (transcript available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/10/03/remarks-vice-president-john-f-kennedy-
forum).
4. Zbigniew Brzezinski, THE GRAND CHESSBOARD: AMERICAN PRIMACY AND ITS
GEOSTRATEGIC IMPERATIVES 46 (1998).
5. See Tanisha M. Fazal, State Death in the International System, 58 INT'L ORG. 311
(2004) (demonstrating heightened risks to buffer States).
6. See TIMOTHY SNYDER, BLOODLANDS: EUROPE BETWEEN HITLER AND STALIN ix
(2012).
7. See Benjamin Miller, Is peace possible-and how? The four-fold response of
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potentially three, broad issues of concern.
First, the worthlessness of the Security Council in preventing
aggression, especially by a Great Power, has been demonstrated beyond
dispute. Of course it has been obvious almost from the beginnings of the
United Nations that the Council was a failure in providing a functioning
collective security system. The fact that NATO-which was indeed a
successful collective security system-had to be created only four years
after the inception of the U.N. Charter attests to that. But now, after
NATO's 1999 intervention in Kosovo, the 2003 Second Gulf War, and the
2008 Russian invasion of Georgia-none of which was expressly
authorized by the Council, and all of which were hammer blows to its
prestige and credibility-the Crimean intervention reveals the uselessness
of the Council even at mobilizing international concern over, and
disapproval of, aggression. The Council certainly is not and never has
been an effective international policeman; but it is not even a very
influential international jury. If international lawyers are concerned (as they
should be) with devising and institutionalizing arrangements that may offer
a realistic chance of promoting international peace and preventing
aggression, they should be focusing on alternatives to the Charter scheme.
Second and more generally, the Crimean episode is powerful evidence
of the incapacity of non-Charter international law (including international
criminal law) to curb aggression and promote peace, at least when Great
Power politics are involved.
Third, we now have (another) test case of the effectiveness of economic
sanctions in preventing, punishing or rolling back aggression.
Undoubtedly, the sanctions that the U.S. and the E.U. imposed on Russia
since the Crimean intervention have had some bite. But will they prove
strong enough to force Russia to disgorge Crimea, or even to deter further
Russian depredations against Ukraine?o How effective are economic
sanctions-the Liberal alternative to war-at restraining wrongful uses of
force in the (apparently favorable) environment of a highly integrated,
international relations theory, 63 INT'L J. 163 (2010).
8. See MICHAEL GLENNON, THE FOG OF LAW: PRAGMATISM, SECURITY, AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2010) (which critiques the effectiveness of the Security Council).
9. See, Too smart by half? Effective sanctions have always been hard to craft, THE
ECONOMIST, Sept. 6, 2014, available at http://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21615603-
effective-sanctions-have-always-been-hard-craft-too-smart-half See also Katherine Barbieri, The
Liberal Illusion: Does Trade Promote Peace? (2005) (empirical evidence does not support thesis
that trade interdependence tends to reduce militarized conflict); David Rowe, The Tragedy of
Liberalism: How Globalization Caused the First World War, 14 Security Stud. 407 (2005).
10. See Laurence Norman, Incoming EU's Foreign Policy Chief Questions Impact ofRussia
Sanctions, WALL ST. J., Oct. 6, 2014, available at http://online.wsj.com/articles/eus-incoming-
foreign-policy-chief-questions-impact-of-russia-sanctions- 1412629812#printMode
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globalized economy?" We shall see.
In this paper, I propose to study the application of international public
law-and more particularly, contemporary jus ad bellum rules-to the
Russian intervention in, and ensuing annexation of, Crimea. The analysis
falls into three main parts, roughly: liability; defenses; and remedies.
In Part I, I shall consider three main legal questions:
I. Was Russia's intervention in Ukraine an illegal use of force?
II. Was Crimea's secession legal?
III. Was Russia's annexation of Crimea legal?
These questions are of course interrelated, but each poses distinct issues
of its own.
In Part II, I will consider certain defenses that Russia offered for its
conduct. I shall pay particularly close attention to Russian President
Vladimir Putin's speech of March 18, 2014 which lays out such defenses,
not only of a political nature, but also under international law.12 To be sure,
President Putin's speech is not an academic address. It is not even a
memorandum of law prepared by the Russian Federation's Foreign Ministry
or its legal advisers. But it is nonetheless legally sophisticated. It also
demonstrates in a very practical way how the language of international law
has become a vital ingredient of contemporary statecraft and strategy.
In Part III, I shall review the possible remedies, both non-criminal and
criminal, for Russia's wrongdoing that appear to be afforded by
international law.
PART I: LIABILITY
Factual Background
First, then, let me briefly outline the most important facts required for
our legal analysis. Some claims, to be sure, are contested, and some
material facts are unknown. Moreover, different governments and media
outlets may provide very different versions of the factual record. Here I rely
in large part on the British Broadcasting Company's (BBC) News' updated
Ukraine crisis timeline.1 3
11. For a critical view, see Robert Pape, Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work, 22 INT'L
SECURITY 90 (1997).
12. See Address by President of the Russian Federation (March 2014), available at
http://eng.kremlin.ru/news/6889. [hereinafter Putin Address]
13. Ukraine crisis: Timeline, BBC NEWS EUROPE (Nov. 13, 2014), available at
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-26248275. [hereinafter BBC TIMELINE].
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It is undisputed that the Ukraine parliament declared independence
from the disintegrating U.S.S.R. in August, 1991.14 In a nationwide
referendum, 90% of the Ukrainian population voted for independence. (In
Crimea, 54% of voters supported independence.1 5 ) Ukraine subsequently
achieved recognition from the international community, including Russia,
as an independent State. Although a part of the Soviet Union, Ukraine had
been a separate Member State of the United Nations since 1945, and it
remained so after seceding from the Soviet Union in 1991.16
In December 1994, in exchange for Ukraine's abandonment of the
nuclear arsenal it inherited after the collapse of the former Soviet Union and
its promise to join the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, Ukraine, Russia,
the United States, and the United Kingdom all entered into the "Budapest
Memorandum," which in part "confirm[ed]" that
[t]he Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland and the United States of America reaffirm their
commitment to Ukraine, in accordance with the principles of the
Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in
Europe, to respect the independence and sovereignty and the
existing borders of Ukraine.1 7 (emphasis added).
Ukraine fulfilled all of the obligations it assumed under the Budapest
Memorandum.
14. MARK BEISSINGER, NATIONALIST MOBILIZATION AND THE COLLAPSE OF THE SOVIET
STATE, 197 (2002).
15. See Adam Taylor, To understand Crimea, take a look back at its complicated history,
WASH. POST, (Feb. 27, 2014) available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2014/02/27/to-understand-crimea-take-a-
look-back-at-its-complicated-history/.
16. HENRY SCHERMERS & NIELS BLOKKER, INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONAL LAW, 635
(5th ed. 2011).
17. Previously, on December 21, 1991, Russia and Ukraine, together with all the other
former Soviet republics-except Georgia had signed the Alma-Ata Declaration, formally
dissolving the Soviet Union and bringing the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) into
existence. The Declaration's Preamble stated that the signatories "recogniz[ed] and respect[ed]
each other's territorial integrity and the inviolability of existing borders." See THE ALMA-ATA
DECLARATION (Dec. 21, 1991), available at http://1cweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/belarusby_appnc.html.
The Alma-Ata Declaration itself endorsed the "aims and principles" of the "Belavezha Accords,"
which had been signed on December 8, 1991 by the leaders of three Soviet republics-Russian
President Yeltsin, Ukrainian President Kravchuk and Belarussian Parliament Chairman
Shushkevich. For a translation, see http://1cweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/belarusby_appnb.html. The
Belavezha Accords had purported to provide for the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the
creation of the CIS. Any doubt as to the legal effectiveness of the Belavezha Accords was
apparently erased by the Alma-Ata Declaration. Article 5 of the Belavezha Accords had stated that
"[t]he high contracting parties recognize and respect one another's territorial integrity and the
inviolability of existing borders within the Commonwealth." Thus, Russia twice agreed in 1991 to
respect Ukraine's "existing" borders, which included Crimea.
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The "existing borders of Ukraine" in 1994 included Crimea. Crimea
had long been part of Russia and remains predominantly ethnically Russian,
but was incorporated into Ukraine, then a Soviet Republic, in 1954. In
1991, in connection with the independence of Ukraine, Crimea became part
of Ukraine as an "Autonomous Republic.""
In May 1997, Russia and Ukraine signed the "Partition Treaty on the
Status and Conditions of the Black Sea Fleet."1 9 Under this Treaty, the two
nations established independent navies and divided bases and armaments
between them. Russia retained the right to use the port of Sevastapol in
Crimea until 2017, and to maintain up to 24,000 troops on the Crimean
peninsula. President Putin alludes to this Treaty in the address we shall
consider.2 0 The 2010 "Kharkiv Pact" between Russia and Ukraine extended
the Russian lease on Sevastopol.2 1
The current Ukraine Crisis can be said to have begun in November
2013 when the Ukraine government under then-President Viktor
Yanukovych abandoned its agreement to form closer trade ties with the
E.U. and announced that it would seek co-operation with Russia instead.
These decisions triggered protests in Ukraine that grew rapidly asked youin
size: in December 2013, at least 800,000 people attended a demonstration in
Kiev. By February, Kiev saw its worst day of violence in seventy years. In
late February, the Ukraine Parliament designated its Speaker as interim
President and issued an arrest warrant for Mr. Yanukovych. Immediately
thereafter, pro-Russian gunmen seized key buildings in the Crimean capital,
Simferopol, and gunmen in combat uniforms appeared outside Crimea's
main airports.22
On March 1, President Putin asked for and received the approval of the
upper house of the Russian Parliament to use Russian forces anywhere in
Ukraine's territory, without the Ukraine's consent, because of an alleged
18. For a valuable and detailed account of the legal relationship at various times between
Ukraine and Crimea, see J. Gordon Hylton, Understanding the Constitutional Situation in Crimea,
MARQ. U. L. SCH. FAC. BLOG, (last visited Feb. 11, 2015),
http://law.marquette.edu/facultyblog/2014/03/16/understanding-the-constitutional-situation-in-
crimea/. Although the status of Crimea within Ukraine was contested after Ukraine became
independent in 1991, the Crimean Constitution was amended in 1992 to identify Crimea as part of
Ukraine.
19. Natalia Belitser & Oleg Bodruk, Conflicting Loyalties in the Crimea, in CONFLICTING
LOYALTIES AND THE STATE IN POST-SOVIET RUSSIA AND EURASIA 76 (Michael Waller et al.
eds., 1998).
20. The Russian-language treaty text is available on the Russian Foreign Ministry's website,
http://mid.ru/bdomp/spd md.nsf/0/2A9A2EBODFBBFA3744257CEB003F9995.
21. Philip P. Pan, Ukraine to extend Russia naval base lease, pay less for natural gas,
WASH. POST, (Apr. 22, 2010), http:// http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/04/21/AR2010042103836.html
22. BBC TIMELINE, supra note 13.
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threat to the lives of Russian citizens.2 3 Also on that date, Western media
reported that Russian troops seized control of vital installations across
Crimea.24 On March 2, Ukraine's interim Prime Minister stated that Russia
had in effect declared war on Ukraine, and the United States claimed that
Russia was in control of Crimea. On March 4, President Putin claimed that
unidentified bands of heavily-armed men making an appearance in Crimea
were not Russian troops, but local self-defense forces.2 5 However, based on
the analysis of photographs of these bands, a Finnish military expert
identified them as Russian high readiness forces.2 6 On March 11, BBC
News reported that most reporters on the scene considered the heavily
armed bands described by Putin as "self-defenses forces"2 7 (elsewhere
called the "little green men" because of the color of their uniforms) were in
fact Russian troops.2 8
According to a speech to the UK Parliament on March 4 by Foreign
Minister William Hague, "Russian forces in Crimea [have] take[n] control
of Ukrainian military sites, including in Belbek, Balaclava and Kerch,
and ... establish[ed] full operational control in the Crimea. Helicopters and
planes have been deployed."2 9 Hague further stated that "Russia has also
argued that Russian-speaking minorities in Ukraine are in danger, but no
evidence of that threat has been presented." Finally, Hague noted that
[I]nternational diplomatic mechanisms exist to provide assurance
on the situations of national minorities, including within the
Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe and the
Council of Europe. These mechanisms are the way to secure
assurances of protection of the rights of minorities, not the breaking
23. Alison Smale & Steven Erlanger, Ukraine Mobilizes Reserve Troops, Threatening War,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 2014, http:/Ihttp://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/02/world/europe/ukraine.html.
24. See Kathy Lally, William Booth & Will Englund, Russian forces seize Crimea;
Ukraine's interim president decries 'aggression,' WASH.PoST, March 1, 2014,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/a-deeply-concerned-obama-warns-russia-against-action-
in-crimea/2014/03/01/c56ca34c-al 11-11 e3-a050-dc3322a94fa7_story.html.
25. Julian Borger, Putin offers Ukraine olive branches delivered by Russian tanks, THE
GUARDIAN (March 4, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/mar/04/putin-ukraine-
olive-branches-russian-tanks.
26. Crimea Invaded by High Readiness Forces of Russian Federation, SUOMEN SOTILAS
(March 3, 2014), http://www.suomensotilas.fi/en/artikkelit/crimea-invaded-high-readiness-forces-
russian-federation.
27. Julian Borger, Putin offers Ukraine olive branches delivered by Russian tanks, THE
GUARDIAN (March 4, 2014), available at http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/mar/04/putin-
ukraine-olive-branches-russian-tanks.
28. Vitaly Shevchenko, "Little green men" or "Russian invaders"?, BBC NEWS EUR. (Mar.
11, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26532154.
29. William Hague, Remarks on UK's response to the situation in Ukraine (March 4, 2014),
transcript available at https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/uks-response-to-the-situation-in-
ukraine.
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of international agreements and the use of armed force.3 0
On March 6, the Crimean parliament voted to secede from Ukraine and
join Russia. It scheduled a referendum for March 16.31 The next day,
President Putin announced that Russia would support Crimea if it decided
to secede.3 2
On March 14, the Constitutional Court of Ukraine ruled the Crimean
parliament's call for the referendum to be unconstitutional. 3 3
The referendum took place as scheduled on March 16. Official results
showed that 97% of those voting supported the proposal to join Russia.3 4
Other observers contended that only 50-60% of the voters supported the
proposal.3 5 On March 18, President Putin addressed the Russian parliament
in the speech we shall soon consider. He also signed a bill to annex Crimea
into the Russian Federation.3 6 These actions were condemned by the U.S.
and the E.U. 37
On March 22, Russian troops stormed the Ukrainian military airbase at
Balbek in Crimea, forcing the surrender of the Ukrainian soldiers stationed
there, and Russian troops, joined by Crimean "self-defense" forces, seized a
Ukrainian warship, the Slavutych.3 8
On March 28, President Putin asked the Russian Parliament to
terminate the 1997 Partition Treaty with Ukraine. 39  The Parliament
unanimously terminated the treaty on March 31 40
On April 17, Putin appeared to admit that the "little green men" were,
30. Id.
31. Ukraine Fast Facts, CNN, http://www.cnn.com/2014/02/28/world/europe/ukraine-fast-
facts/ (last visited Dec. 9 2014). [hereinafter Fast Facts].
32. Jane C. Timm, Russia backs secession vote in Crimea, MSNBC (Mar. 7, 2014),
http:/ihttp://www.msnbc.com/morning-joe/russia-backs-secession-vote-crimea.
33. See Judgment of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine on all-Crimean Referendum
(March 14, 2014), English trans. available at http://mfa.gov.ua/en/news-feeds/foreign-offices-
news/19573-rishennya-konstitucijnogo-sudu-v-ukrajini-shhodo-referendumu-v-krimu.
34. Fast Facts, supra note 31.
35. Paul R. Gregory, Putin's 'Human Rights Council' Accidentally Posts Real Crimean
Election Results, FORBES (Mar. 5, 2014), http://
http://www.forbes.com/sites/paulroderickgregory/2014/05/05/putins-human-rights-council-
accidentally-posts-real-crimean-election-results-only-15-voted-for-annexation/.
36. Fast Facts, supra note 31.
37. Id.
38. Fast Facts, supra note 31.
39. Putin submits proposal on denouncing some Russia-Ukraine agreements on Black Sea
Fleet, INFORMATION TELEGRAPH AGENCY OF RUSSIA (Mar. 28, 2014), http://itar-
tass.com/en/russia/725725.
40. State Duma approves denunciation ofRussia-Ukrainian agreements on Black Sea Fleet,
INFORMATION TELEGRAPH AGENCY OF RUSSIA (Mar. 31, 2014), http://itar-
tass.com/en/russia/725964.
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in fact, troops that Russia sent into Crimea in unmarked uniforms.41
In July, 2014, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov appeared to
warn Ukraine that Russia would use nuclear weapons if Ukraine sought to
retake Crimea.42
In his December, 2014 State of the Union Address, President Putin said
that "Crimea, the ancient Korsun or Chersonesus, and Sevastopol have
invaluable civilisational and even sacral importance for Russia, like the
Temple Mount in Jerusalem for the followers of Islam and Judaism."4 3
Actions By the United Nations
On March 15, Russia vetoed a draft Security Council Resolution,
proposed by the United States, that would have deemed the Crimean
secession invalid. Only Russia opposed the draft resolution; China
abstained. All thirteen remaining members of the Council voted in favor of
the draft.44
On March 24, Ukraine submitted a draft resolution to the General
Assembly on the Crimean issue.4 5 Ukraine's draft was similar to the draft
that Russia had vetoed in the Security Council. The General Assembly
adopted that resolution on March 27.46 Of the 193 nations in the Assembly,
100 voted in favor and 11 against, with 58 abstentions.4 7 The resolution
dismisses Crimea's vote as "having no validity, (and) cannot form the basis
for any alteration of the status of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea or of
41. Direct Line with Vladimir Putin, PRESIDENT OF RUSSIA WEBSITE (Apr. 17, 2014),
available at http://eng.kremlin.ru/news/7034, where Putin was asked about the "little green men,"
Putin replied: "in my conversations with my foreign colleagues I did not hide the fact that our goal
was to ensure proper conditions for the people of Crimea to be able to freely express their will.
And so we had to take the necessary measures in order to prevent the situation in Crimea
unfolding the way it is now unfolding in southeastern Ukraine. We didn't want any tanks, any
nationalist combat units or people with extreme views armed with automatic weapons. Of course,
the Russian servicemen did back the Crimean self-defence forces. They acted in a civil but a
decisive and professional manner, as I've already said."generaa Avedis Hadjian, Back in the
USSR, LE MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE (Eng. ed., June 1, 2014), available at
http://mondediplo.com/2014/06/01ukraine.
42. Zachary Keck, Russian Threatens Nuclear Strikes Over Crimea, THE DIPLOMAT (July
11, 2014), available at http://thediplomat.com/2014/07/russia-threatens-nuclear-strikes-over-
crimea/.
43. Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly (Dec. 4, 2014),
http://eng.kremlin.ru/news/23341.
44. Somini Sengupta, Russia Vetoes U.N. Resolution on Crimea, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 15,
2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/16/world/europe/russia-vetoes-un-resolution-on-
crimea.html.
45. Somini Sengupta, Vote by U.N. General Assembly Isolates Russia, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 27,
2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/28/world/europe/General-Assembly-Vote-on-
Crimea.html.
46. Id.
47. Id.
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the City of Sevastopol."4 8 The resolution, which does not mention Russia by
name, says the General Assembly "calls upon all States, international
organizations and specialized agencies not to recognize any alteration of the
status" of Crimea and Sevastopol.4
A. Russia's Prima Facie Legal Liability
Did Russia commit aggression or otherwise violate jus ad bellum rules?
Two questions must be addressed in considering Russia's liability for
violating current use of force rules.o The first question is whether Russia's
actions in Crimea amounted to an "armed attack" within the meaning of
U.N. Charter Art. 51, which concerns the inherent right of self-defense
against such attacks. The second question is whether Russia's actions
amounted to "aggression" within the meaning of U.N. General Assembly
Resolution 3314, the "Definition of Aggression. "1 A brief explanation of
the terms "armed attack" and "aggression" is therefore essential.
Armed Attacks
What is an "armed attack" under Art. 51? The International Court of
Justice (I.C.J.) has generally understood an "armed attack" in terms of the
gravity of force that is used.52 Thus, a cross-border raid by a hostile army
would likely be considered an armed attack, while occasional and episodic
exchanges of fire across a contested international border (as in Kashmir)
would not be. Indeed, the Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission opined that
48. Reuters, U.N. General Assembly Declares Crimea Secession Vote Invalid, NEWSWEEK
(Mar. 27, 2014), http://www.newsweek.com/un-general-assembly-declares-crimea-secession-
vote-invalid-238680
49. Id.
50. Both questions presuppose that Russia was not authorized to intervene by the Security
Council acting under Chapter VII of the Charter (which is uncontroversial) and that Russia was
not acting in lawful self-defense under Article 51 against an actual or imminent armed attack by
Ukraine. The latter assumption will be defended later in this paper.
51. Definition of Aggression, United Nations General Assembly Resolution 3314, xxix,
available athttps://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/GAres3314.html.
52. See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United
States ofAmerica), INT'L CT. JUST. at ¶ 195: [I]t may be considered to be agreed that an armed
attack must be understood as including not merely action by regular armed forces across an
international border, but also "the sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands, groups,
irregulars or mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force against another State of such
gravity as to amount to" (inter alia) an actual armed attack conducted by regular forces, "or its
substantial involvement therein". This description, contained in Article 3, paragraph (g), of the
Definition of Aggression annexed to General Assembly resolution 3314 (XXIX), may be taken to
reflect customary international law. The Court sees no reason to deny that, in customary law, the
prohibition of armed attacks may apply to the sending by a State of armed bands to the territory of
another State, if such an operation, because of its scale and effects, would have been classified as
an armed attack rather than as a mere frontier incident had it been carried out by regular armed
forces.
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"[1]ocalized border encounters between small infantry units, even those
involving the loss of life, do not constitute an armed attack for purposes of
the Charter." 5 3
Although it enjoys some judicial and arbitral support, the I.C.J.'s
"gravity of harm" test seems to create perverse incentives. As a former U.S.
State Department Legal Adviser has written, to define an armed attack in
terms of gravity
[W]ould encourage States to engage in a series of small-scale
military attacks, in the hope that they could not do so without being
subject to defensive responses. Moreover, if States were required to
wait until attacks reached a high level of gravity before responding
with force, their eventual response would likely be much greater,
making it more difficult to prevent disputes from escalating into
full-scale military conflicts.5 4
Thus, some international law experts reject the "gravity" test. For
instance, the authors of the Chatham House Principles of International Law
on Use of Force in Self-Defence, a group of leading British diplomats, legal
advisers, scholars and barristers, wrote:
An armed attack means any use of armed force, and does not need
to cross some threshold of intensity. Any requirement that a use of
force must attain a certain gravity and that frontier incidents, for
example, are excluded is relevant only in so far as the minor nature
of an attack is prima facie evidence of absence of intention to attack
or honest mistake. It may also be relevant to the issues of necessity
and proportionality.
According to these authorities, the test used by the I.C.J. is not
generally accepted.
The General Assembly's 1974 Definition ofAggression
After protracted consideration, the United Nations General Assembly
53. Eritrea Ethiopia Claims Commission, Partial Award, Jus ad Bellum, Ethiopia's Claims
1-8, THE HAGUE, 19 Dec. 2005, at ¶ 11.
54. William H. Taft IV, Self-defense and the Oil Platforms Decision, 29 YALE J. INT'L L.
295, 300-01(2004).
55. To read results on the matter, copy this link:
https://www.google.com/search?q=chatham+house+principles+on+international+law+on+use+of
+force&rls=com.microsoft:en-US&ie=UTF-8&oe=UTF-
8&startlndex=&startPage=1&gws-rd=ssl.
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promulgated a definition of "aggression" in General Assembly Resolution
(GA Res.) 3314. This definition has understandably become very
influential. Moreover, it has become a component of the definition of the
crime of "aggression" proposed in 2010 Kampala amendments 5 6 as Article
8bis (2) of the 1998 Rome Statute,5 7 which established the International
Criminal Court (I.C.C.) and determined its jurisdiction. Although it was not
originally framed as part of the definition of an international crime," GA
Res. 3314 can be and has been adapted to that purpose. Moreover, the
General Assembly's definition of "aggression" has contributed to the
understanding of the crime of "aggression" that has evolved in customary
law since the Nuremberg Trials.5 9
What is the force of GA Res. 3314? Under the U.N. Charter, the
General Assembly is not a legislative or law-making body.60 The powers
and functions of the General Assembly are set forth in Chapter V of the
Charter. These provisions make plain that the General Assembly is a forum
for debate and deliberation. It may conduct studies, express opinions, and
submit recommendations to the Security Council. It may also seek Advisory
Opinions from the I.C.J.. The General Assembly has no general power to
make rules of international law, however.
Nonetheless, General Assembly actions, especially well-considered
prescriptive statements such as GA Res. 3314, are not without legal effect.
56. Article 5(1) of the 1998 Rome Statute, which specified the crimes within the I.C.C.'s
jurisdiction, included among them "the crime of aggression." But the original Statute itself did
not define the crime of aggression nor attempt to enumerate its elements. Instead, Article 5(2)
stated: "The Court shall exercise jurisdiction over the crime of aggression once a provision is
adopted in accordance with articles 121 and 123 defining the crime and setting out the conditions
under which the Court shall exercise jurisdiction with respect to this crime. Such a provision shall
be consistent with the relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations." That conscious
omission will be filled if and when the amendments to the Rome Statute proposed in 2010 at
Kampala enter into force. The proposed definition of "aggression" refers to and incorporates GA
Res. 3314 in its explanation of the term "act of aggression." See Resolution RC/Res.6, The crime
of aggression (June 11, 2010), available at http://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/aspdocs/Resolutions/RC-Res.6-ENG.pdf; Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court, XVII.10 (July 17, 1998), available at http://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/aspdocs/RC2010/AMENDMENTS/CN.651.2010-ENG-CoA.pdf; Tom Ruys,
Defining the Crime of Aggression: The Kampala Consensus 15-17, Working Paper No. 57,
January 2011, https://ghum.kuleuven.be/ggs/publications/workingpapers/newseries/wp51-
60/wp57.pdf.
57. Entered into force 2002, see Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17,
1998, available at http://legal.un.org/icc/statute/romefra.htm.
58. The Resolution does, however, observe that aggression is an international crime.
59. See the decision of the UK House of Lords in Crown v. Jones, [2006] UKHL 16, at ¶¶
13-19 (lead opinion),
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/1d200506/ldjudgmt/jd060329/jones.pdf
60. For closer and more detailed analyses, see Marko Divac Oberg, The Legal Effects of
Resolutions of the U.N. Security Council and General Assembly in the Jurisprudence of the I.C.1,
16 EUR. J. INT'L L. 879 (2005); Stephen M. Schwebel, The Effect of Resolutions of the U.N.
General Assembly on Customary International Law, 73 PROC. ASIL 301 (1979).
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For one thing, they may serve as interpretations (or be "declaratory") of
international law; for another, they can constitute evidence of customary
international law. Further, in the 1996 Nuclear Weapons Case, the I.C.J.
attributed "normative value" to some of them. There the Court wrote that
"General Assembly resolutions, even if they are not binding, may
sometimes have normative value. 6 1 They can, in certain circumstances,
provide evidence important for establishing the existence of a rule or the
emergence of an opinio juris. "62 There are several ambiguities in the I.C.J.'s
formulation. Do General Assembly Resolutions have "normative value"
distinct from being "evidence" of customary law? Or does their "normative
value" consist in their being such "evidence"? And do they constitute (or
evidence) a rule of customary law both as state practice and as opiniojuris,
or only as opiniojuris?
Later pronouncements by the I.C.J. leave these questions still
undecided. In an opinion from 2005, Congo v. Uganda, the I.C.J.
specifically cited and relied on Article 3(g) of GA Res. 3314 in deciding
whether Congo had "sent" armed groups against Uganda, and that reliance
might suggest that the Court regarded the Resolution has as stating (rather
than merely evidencing) a legal rule.6 3 But elsewhere in the Congo case,6 4
the I.C.J. held that another General Assembly Resolution, the 1970
Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly
Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter
of the United Nations, was "declaratory of customary international law." 65
So perhaps the Court would say only that Resolution 3314 "declared," but
did not create or contribute to creating, customary law.
In the present instance, however, it may not matter. If the General
Assembly's definition of "aggression" is eventually codified in the Rome
Statute, it will become positive, treaty law.
GA Res. 3314 carefully and cautiously notes that "the question whether
an act of aggression has been committed must be considered in the light of
all the circumstances of each particular case." Accordingly, it attempts only
"to formulate basic principles as guidance for such determination." These
"basic principles" are very broad. In the abstract, "[a]ggression is the use of
armed force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or
political independence of another State, or in any other manner inconsistent
61. Legality of the Use or Threat of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. REPORTS 226, 254-55
(July 8).
62. Id.
63. Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v.
Uganda), Judgment, 2005 I.C.J. REPORTS 168 at TT 146 (Dec. 19).
64. Id. at TT 162-63.
65. G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), U.N. (GAOR) 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, U.N. Doc. A/5217, at
121 (1970).
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with the Charter of the United Nations." That understanding is then
explained by listing, in Article 3, a variety of acts that, regardless of
whether a declaration of war has been issued, qualify as "act[s] of
aggression":
a) The invasion or attack by the armed forces of a State of the
territory of another State, or any military occupation, however
temporary, resulting from such invasion or attack, or any
annexation by the use of force of the territory of another State or
part thereof;
(b) Bombardment by the armed forces of a State against the
territory of another State or the use of any weapons by a State
against the territory of another State;
(c) The blockade of the ports or coasts of a State by the armed
forces of another State;
(d) An attack by the armed forces of a State on the land, sea or air
forces, or marine and air fleets of another State;
(e) The use of armed forces of one State which are within the
territory of another State with the agreement of the receiving State,
in contravention of the conditions provided for in the agreement or
any extension of their presence in such territory beyond the
termination of the agreement;
(f) The action of a State in allowing its territory, which it has placed
at the disposal of another State, to be used by that other State for
perpetrating an act of aggression against a third State;
(g) The sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands, groups,
irregulars or mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force
against another State of such gravity as to amount to the acts listed
above, or its substantial involvement therein.6 6
Of critical importance, Article 5(1) states: No consideration of whatever
nature, whether political, economic, military or otherwise, may serve as a
justification for aggression. However, this sweeping statement may be
qualified by Article 7:
Nothing in this Definition, and in particular article 3, could in any
way prejudice the right to self-determination, freedom and
independence, as derived from the Charter, of peoples forcibly
deprived of that right and referred to in the Declaration on
Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and
66. Resolution 3314, supra note 49.
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Cooperation among States in accordance with the Charter of the
United Nations, particularly peoples under colonial and racist
regimes or other forms of alien domination: nor the right of these
peoples to struggle to that end and to seek and receive support, in
accordance with the principles of the Charter and in conformity
with the above-mentioned Declaration.6 7
Application to Russia's Intervention
In applying these legal concepts to Russia's action in Crimea, we must
bear in mind that in the period from 1991 to 2014, Russia unambiguously
recognized the sovereignty of Ukraine and the integrity of its international
borders, including its sovereignty over Crimea. Russia "reaffirmed" the
"existing borders" of Ukraine in the Budapest memorandum of 1994, and
implicitly reaffirmed that Crimea was under Ukrainian sovereignty in the
1997 Partition Treaty and the 2010 Kharkiv Pact. Furthermore, Ukraine's
territorial borders, including Crimea, are internationally recognized, as was
reflected in the Budapest memorandum, to which the U.S. and the U.K.
were also parties, and by the General Assembly Resolution of March
2014.68
The clear preponderance of opinion within the international community
of States, as demonstrated by the majority votes of both the Security
Council and the General Assembly, is that Russia violated international law
of war regarding the use of force by its military activities in Crimea. There
appear to be at least three ways in which Russia has done so.
First, it seems undisputed that Russian military forces actually attacked
the Ukrainian military in Crimea on March 22.69 True, these incidents
happened in Crimean territory, and by March 22, Crimea had purported to
secede. But if that secession was invalid (as the General Assembly and most
67. Resolution 3314, supra note 49, at art.7.
68. Even accepting Mr. Putin's claim that the ouster of Ukrainian President Yanukovych
was "an unconstitutional coup, an armed seizure of power," Direct Line with Vladimir Putin,
PRESIDENT OF RUSSIA WEBSITE (Apr. 17, 2014), http://eng.kremlin.ru/news/7034; it would not
follow that that change in government terminated Russia's pre-existing treaties with Ukraine-and
certainly not that it terminated the land boundaries fixed by those treaties. Even a revolutionary
change of government in one of the parties does not automatically terminate a bilateral treaty. See
The Sapphire, 78 U.S. 164, 168 (1876) ("The reigning sovereign represents the national
sovereignty, and that sovereignty is continuous and perpetual, residing in the proper successors of
the sovereign for the time being.... On his deposition the sovereignty does not change, but
merely the person or persons in whom it resides. The foreign state is the true and real owner of its
public vessels of war. The reigning Emperor or national assembly or other actual person or party
in power is but the agent and representative of the national sovereignty. A change in such
representative works no change in the national sovereignty or its rights ... A ... treaty with a
sovereign as such ensures to his successors in the government of the country."); see also Note,
Revolutions, Treaties, and State Succession, 76 YALE L.J. 1669 (1967).
69. Fast Facts, supra note 31.
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of the Security Council considered it to be), then Russia was attacking
Ukraine on Ukrainian soil. This is tantamount to a military invasion and an
"armed attack" for purposes of the U.N. Charter. It would also constitute an
"act of aggression" under GA Res. 3314.70
Furthermore, according to the U.K. Foreign Minister and Western
media, Russia had both deployed helicopters and planes into Ukraine and
taken control of Ukrainian military bases in Crimea, even before the
referendum on secession. And if in that period Russia had deployed military
personnel whose presence in parts of Crimea was authorized by the
Partition Treaty outside the areas where they were allowed, that very act
could also constitute an illegal invasion of Ukraine, even if (as President
Putin alleged) those forces had committed no acts of violence.
Putin made that claim in his address of March 16 to the Russia
Parliament, which we shall examine in detail later. But that part of his
speech merits some attention now. Putin said:
[W]hat exactly are we violating? True, the President of the Russian
Federation received permission from the Upper House of
Parliament to use the Armed Forces in Ukraine. However, strictly
speaking, nobody has acted on this permission yet. Russia's Armed
Forces never entered Crimea; they were there already in line with
an international agreement. True, we did enhance our forces there;
however - this is something I would like everyone to hear and
know - we did not exceed the personnel limit of our Armed Forces
in Crimea, which is set at 25,000, because there was no need to do
so.... Other thoughts come to mind in this connection. They keep
talking of some Russian intervention in Crimea, some sort of
aggression. This is strange to hear. I cannot recall a single case in
history of an intervention without a single shot being fired and with
no human casualties.7 1
It is true, as Putin argues, that Russian forces were lawfully present
70. See Namibia (S.W. Africa), Advisory Opinion (June 21) [1971] ICJ Reports 16, Separate
Opinion of Ammoun, J., p. 89 at ¶ 12 ("An armed force which violates the frontiers of a country
undoubtedly commits aggression") (referring to South Africa's military occupation, in breach of
terms of U.N. Mandate, of Namibia). The very idea of State sovereignty entails that one
sovereign may not enter into another's territory without the latter's consent: as Chief Justice John
Marshall affirmed as long ago as 1812, "[o]ne sovereign being in no respect amenable to another,
and being bound by obligations of the highest character not to degrade the dignity of his nation by
placing himself or its sovereign rights within the jurisdiction of another, can be supposed to enter
a foreign territory only under an express license, or in the confidence that the immunities
belonging to his independent sovereign station, though not expressly stipulated, are reserved by
implication, andwill be extended to him." The Exchange v. McFadden, 11 U.S. 116, 137 (1812).
71. Putin Address, supra note 12.
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within the parts of Crimea that Russia had leased from Ukraine under the
Partition Treaty and the Kharkiv Pact. But if Russia moved any of those
forces into any other part of Crimea without Ukraine's consent, whether
before or after the referendum on secession, then that would constitute an
unlawful act of aggression, even if the Russian troops did not open fire and
even if no casualties resulted from the troop movement.7 2
It is astonishing that Putin should claim that he could not recall a single
bloodless invasion: the Soviet-led intervention of 200,000 Warsaw Pact
troops in Czechoslovakia in 1968 was bloodless, or virtually so.73 The Nazi
takeover of the Czech lands of Bohemia and Moravia in March, 1939 was
resisted only by citizens of Prague hurling snowballs. 74 Although the
Danish military offered limited resistance to the Nazi invaders of that nation
in 1940, the fighting consisted mostly of skirmishes and casualties were
apparently low. 7 5 These troop movements were unmistakably invasions and,
in the case of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, violations of Charter
law.76 Low numbers of casualties, or even the absence of any casualties,
does not entail that the hostile movement of troops across an international
boundary is not an act of aggression.
There is in fact judicial authority to this effect. In its 2007 decision in
Karins v. Parliament of Latvia, the Constitutional Court of Latvia
considered whether the peaceful deployment of Soviet troops into Latvia in
June 1940, to which the Latvian Parliament had consented only under
duress, was an act of aggression. The Court held (at T 25.6) that it was, on
the grounds that the lack of resistance to the invasion of another State does
not necessarily mean that no invasion has taken place:
Deployment of armed forces in the territory of another State is one
of the many concepts of international law that are in principle
unlawful but that can be consented to by States. A valid consent by
one State to an act by another State precludes the wrongfulness of
72. Art. 3(e) of GA Res. 3314 includes as an act of aggression "[t]he use of armed forces of
one State which are within the territory of another State with the agreement of the receiving State,
in contravention of the conditions provided for in the agreement or any extension of their presence
in such territory beyond the termination of the agreement."
73. JOHN E. JESSUP, AN ENCYCLOPEDIA DICTIONARY OF CONFLICT AND CONFLICT
RESOLUTION, 1945-1996 799 (1998).
74. Chad Bryant, PRAGUE IN BLACK 1 (2007).
75. Myres S. McDougal & Florentino P. Felicitano, The Initiation of Coercion: A Multi-
temporal Analysis, in INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 709 (1969).
76. The Soviet Union and its allies defended the legality of the invasion of Czechoslovakia
by arguing that the Czech government or people had "invited" the intervention, or alternatively
had "ratified" it after it occurred. The United States seems to have refuted those arguments. See
Legality of Czechoslovak Invasion Questioned in U.N. Special Committee on Principles of
International Law, 7 ILM 1317 (1968), available at
http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/20690433.pdfacceptTC=true&jpdConfirm=true.
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that act in relation to the former State to the extent that the act
remains within the limits of that consent...
If a State has not given consent or if the given consent is not
internationally valid due to some reason (invalidity of the
international treaty, consent due to duress, consent given by de
facto non-existent government), deployment of armed forces in the
territory of another State is a breach of rules of international law.7 7
Russia's actions were such a breach. They clearly were not authorized
by the Security Council pursuant to its Chapter VII authorities under the
Charter. Nor were they justifiable as self-defense under Article 51 as a
lawful and proportionate act of self-defense against a prior or anticipated
Ukrainian attack. There appears to be no evidence indicating that the
Ukrainian military, on the Russian naval base at Sevastopol, elsewhere in
Crimea, or in any other part of Ukraine, had previously attacked, or was
even preparing to attack, Russia forces. If Ukraine's forces had engaged in
an armed attack upon Russian forces other than in response to prior Russian
attacks, the burden of proof of those Ukrainian attacks would lie, under
I.C.J. rulings, on Russia.7 8 Moreover, the Ukrainian military was badly
outnumbered and outclassed by the Russian forces. It is therefore extremely
unlikely that Ukraine attacked first, or was poised to do so.79
Second, Russian forces in Crimea, operating without uniforms or other
recognizable signs of their combatant status, participated in armed attacks
on Ukraine both in the run-up to the March 16 referendum and after it.
President Putin reportedly conceded that some of the non-uniformed
masked men operating in Crimea were regular Russian troops. 0
Third, Russia may have "sent" armed bands of ethnically Russian, pro-
secessionist forces of Ukrainian nationals to combat the Ukrainian military
77. An English-language translation, with accompanying commentary, can be found in the
Oxford Reports on International Law,
http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:ildc/8841v07.case.1/law-ildc-
8841v07?rskey=IDuvFp&result-7&prd=ORIL.
78. See Iran v. US, (2003) I.C.J. Reports, 161 at ¶ 72 (hereinafter "Oil Platform").
79. According to a German legal scholar, "[a]lthough there have been statements of
Ukrainian officials warning Russian troops in Crimea to remain in the territories where they are
allowed to operate. . ., there are currently no reports whatsoever that the Russia fleet stationed in
Crimea has been the object [of] violent acts. . . . An armed attack against Russian military
personnel in Crimea did not occur and cannot be invoked in order to justify the Russian resort to
armed force." Daniel Wisehart, The Crisis in Ukraine and the Prohibition of the Use of Force: A
Legal Basis for Russia's Intervention?, EJIL: TALK! (March 4, 2014), available at
http://www.ejiltalk.org/the-crisis-in-ukraine-and-the-prohibition-of-the-use-of-force-a-legal-basis-
for-russias-intervention/.
80. Avedis Hadjian, Back in the USSR, LE MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE (Eng. ed., June 1, 2014),
available at http://mondediplo.com/2014/06/01ukraine.
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in Crimea. If so, that could well be an act of aggression within the meaning
of GA Res. 3314 and an armed attack under the I.C.J.'s decision in
Nicaragua." And even if Russia did not "send" these bands, but only
provided them with weaponry and logistical support, those actions too
would seem to have violated international law, as declared in the Congo and
Nicaragua cases and the General Assembly's definition of aggression.8 2
B. Was Crimea's Secession Valid Under International Law?
The legality of secession under international law cannot be regarded as
a finally settled question.8 3 Unfortunately, in its 2010 advisory opinion on
the legality of Kosovo's declaration of independence from Serbia,8 4 the
I.C.J. declined to take the occasion to explain the international law of
(remedial) secession. However, in general, secession other than as a remedy
for severe and prolonged human rights abuses is strongly disfavored in
international law, even if a majority of the voters in the seceding region
favor it, unless the nation of which they are a part consents to the
secession." Under that rule, the purported secession of Crimea, even if
supported by the Crimean parliament and by a decisive majority of Crimea
81. To cite the relevant language from Nicaragua again, [1986] I.C.J. Rep. at ¶ 195: [I]t may
be considered to be agreed that an armed attack must be understood as including not merely action
by regular armed forces across an international border, but also "the sending by or on behalf of a
State of armed bands, groups, irregulars or mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force
against another State of such gravity as to amount to" (inter alia) an actual armed attack
conducted by regular forces, "or its substantial involvement therein".
82. See Nicaragua, (1986) I.C.J. Rep. at ¶ 195 ("assistance to rebels in the form of the
provision of weapons or logistical or other support. . . may be regarded as a threat or use of force,
or amount to intervention in the internal or external affairs of other States."). Under the I.C.J.'s
"gravity" test, these violations would not constitute "armed attacks."
83. The leading scholar James Crawford defines "secession" as "the creation of a State by
the use or threat of force without the consent of the former sovereign." JAMES CRAWFORD, THE
CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 375 (2d ed. 2006). Under this definition,
secession is inherently non-consensual. To be clear, however, consensual secession is a different
matter. Thus, Slovakia lawfully seceded from Czechoslovakia with the latter's consent, and
Scotland might have seceded peaceably and lawfully from the U.K. had the voters in its
September 2014 referendum so decided.
Crawford distinguishes between "secession within a metropolitan State" and "the secession of a
self-determination unit and, in particular, of a non-self-governing territory." Id. at 383. In other
words, he distinguishes "salt water colonialism" from the kind of secession at issue in Crimea.
See Lea Brilmayer, Commentaries on Lea Brilmayer, Secession and Self-Determination: A
Territorial Interpretation, 25 YALE J. INT'L L. 283 (2000). Examples of post-World War II
"secessions" of the former kind are the successful case of Bangladesh, the unsuccessful cases of
Katanga and Biafra, and the contested cases of Northern Cyprus and Chechnya. Examples of
secession from "salt water colonialism" include the successful post-War efforts of many former
European colonies in Africa and Asia, such as Algeria and Vietnam, to break away from the
overseas powers that controlled them.
84. Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in
Respect ofKosovo, Advisory Opinion, 2010 I.C.J. Reports, 403 (July 2010).
85. See, e.g., ILIAS BANTEKAS & LUTZ OETTE, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: LAW AND
PRACTICE 415 (2013)
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voters in the referendum of independence, is legally invalid. And so the
General Assembly concluded.
Although international law is unquestionably committed to "the
principle of. . . self-determination of peoples," U.N. Charter art. 1(2), it by
no means follows that any national or ethnic minority may secede at will
from an existing State and declare itself an independent State.8 6 The very
statement in the U.N. Charter that recognizes the principle of self-
determination of "peoples" subordinates that principle to the end of
"develop[ing] friendly relations among nations." Furthermore, art. 2(4) of
the Charter prohibits Member States "from the threat or use of force against
the territorial integrity . . . of any state," and art. 2(7) shelters from U.N.
intervention "matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction
of any state." States will nearly always resist their own forcible
dismemberment, whether at the hands of internal insurgents or at those of
outside powers or, as in Crimea, of both. Because forcible secession will
therefore ordinarily pose a threat to international stability and peace, the
policy of international law is to disfavor it when the State from which
secession is sought does not consent to it. To put it bluntly, Woodrow
Wilson's statement that "[n]o people must be forced under sovereignty
under which it does not wish to live"8 7 is not now, and has never been, the
law.
Rather, what has been and is still the general rule of law was stated in
1920 by a Committee of Jurists appointed by the Council of the League of
Nations to render an opinion on the claim of the ethnically Swedish
population of the Aaland Islands to secede from Finland and become a part
of Sweden." The Committee said:
[I]n the absence of express provisions in international treaties, the
right of disposing of national territory is essentially an attribute of
86. There are, moreover, substantial questions in determining what constitutes a "people"
that can claim the right to self-determination. See Nathaniel Berman, Sovereignty in Abeyance:
Self-Determination and International Law, 7 Wis. J. Int'l L. 51, 90-4 (1988/9). For an analysis of
the concept of a "people" in the context of human rights law, see the opinion of the African
Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, 276/03 Centre for Minority Rights Development
(Kenya) and Minority Rights Group (on behalf ofEndorois Welfare Council) vs. Kenya TT 147-51
(2009), available at
http://www.achpr.org/files/sessions/46th/comunications/276.03/achpr46_276_03_eng.pdf
87. Message from President Wilson to Russia on the Occasion of the Visit of the American
Mission (June 9, 1917), in OFFICIAL STATEMENTS OF WAR AIMS AND PEACE PROPOSALS,
DECEMBER 1916 To NOVEMBER 1918, at 105 (James B. Scott ed., 1921).
88. On this dispute, see James Barros, The Aland Islands Question: Its Settlement by the
League of Nations (1968); Norman J. Padelford, K. Gosta & A. Andersson, The Aaland Islands
Question, 33 AM. J. INT'L L. 465 (1939); Nathaniel Berman. "But the Alternative is Despair":
European Nationalism and the Modernist Renewal ofInternational Law, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1792
(1993).
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the sovereignty of every state. Positive International Law does not
recognise the right of national groups, as such, to separate
themselves from the State of which they form part by the simple
expression of a wish, any more than it recognises the right of other
States to claim such a separation.89
More recently, we may consider the exact and careful statement of
current international law from the Supreme Court of Canada in its 1998
opinion Reference re: Secession of Qudbec.90 While acknowledging that
"the right of a people to self-determination" is "now so widely recognized
in international conventions that the principle has acquired a status beyond
'convention' and is considered a general principle of international law,"
nonetheless "international law expects that the right . .. will be exercised by
peoples within the framework of existing sovereign states and consistently
with the maintenance of the territorial integrity of those states."9 1 Leading
publicists affirm that state practice in the Charter world accords with this
understanding of the law.92
Also relevant is the opinion of the African Commission on Human and
Peoples' Rights in Katangese People 's Congress v. Zaire (2000).93 There
89. Report of the International Commission ofJurists (1920), LNOJ Spec. Supp. 3, 5.
90. Reference re Secession of Qudbec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, 37 I.L.M. 1340 (1998). For an
analysis of the opinion, see Stephen J. Toope, Self-Determination-Canada-Quebec-Right to
Secede Under Constitutional Law and Public International Law-Role of International Law in
Canadian Courts, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 519 (1999). In 2000, the Canadian Parliament enacted the
Clarity Act, S.C. 2000, c. 26, available at http://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/PDF/C-31.8.pdf, to
implement the Supreme Court's decision. The Clarity Act is designed to ensure that a vote on
secession is carefully considered, so that it provides "a clear expression of a will by a clear
majority of the population of a province."
91. Qudbec, 2 S.C.R. 217 ¶¶ 113-14, ¶122. More fully, the Court said: "The recognized
sources of international law establish that the right to self-determination of a people is normally
fulfilled through internal self-determination - a people's pursuit of its political, economic, social
and cultural development within the framework of an existing state. A right to external self-
determination ... arises only in the most extreme of cases and, even then, under carefully defined
circumstances . . . The international law principle of self-determination has evolved within a
framework of respect for the territorial integrity of existing states. The various international
instruments that support the existence of a people's right to self-determination also contain
parallel statements supportive of the conclusion that the exercise of such a right must be
sufficiently limited to prevent threats to an existing state's territorial integrity or the stability of
relations between sovereign states. . . . There is no necessary incompatibility between the
maintenance of the territorial integrity of existing states . . . and the right of a "people" to achieve
a full measure of self-determination." Id. TT 126-27; ¶ 130.
92. See, e.g., Alfred P. Rubin, Secession and Self-Determination: A Legal, Moral, and
Political Analysis, 36 STAN. J. INT'L L. 253, 259 (2000) ("neither treaty, practice, nor common
law precedent establishes any positive legal right to secession or independence of any people,
however grouped").
93. Katangese Peoples' Congress v Zaire (2000) AHRLR 72 (ACHPR 1995),
http://www.chr.up.ac.za/index.php/browse-by-subject/269-drc-katangese-peoples-congress-v-
zaire-2000-ahrlr-72-achpr-1995.html. See also Gunme et al. v. Cameroon (2009) AHRLR 9
No. 1] 145
146 UNIV OF ST THOMAS JOURNAL OFLAW& PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. IX
the Commission stated (at T 4) that:
self-determination may be exercised in any of the following ways -
independence, self-government, local government, federalism,
confederalism, unitarism or any other form of relations that accords
with the wishes of the people, but is fully cognisant of other
recognised principles such as sovereignty and territorial integrity.
Because the Commission found no "concrete evidence of violations of
human rights to the point that the territorial integrity of Zaire should be
called to question and in the absence of evidence that the people of Katanga
are denied the right to participate in government as guaranteed by article
13(1) of the African Charter," it upheld the territorial integrity of Zaire,
denied that Katanga had a right to independence and ruled that "Katanga is
obliged to exercise a variant of self-determination that is compatible with
the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Zaire" (id. at T 6).
Russia itself has stoutly defended this legal framework, in which
secession is disfavored except in an extreme case. In its Written Statement
of October 17, 2008 to the ICJ in the Kosovo Declaration of Independence
Case, Russia affirmed that:
[A] State that respects the rights of peoples living in its territory, is
protected by the principle of territorial integrity from the
implementation of the right to self-determination in the form of
secession ("external self-determination"). As stated by the Supreme
Court of Canada in the Quebec secession case, "the international
law principle of self-determination has evolved within a framework
of respect for the territorial integrity of existing states'. {Footnote
omitted]. Many authors discussing self-determination point out
either that the post-colonial system does not recognize a right to
secession at all, or that, at least, a presumption or a strong
preference exists in favour of territorial integrity.["]
To be sure, secession may be lawful where the population of the
seceding entity has suffered a long train of serious human rights abuses at
the hands of the larger State of which it has been part, and there is little or
(ACHPR 2009) at ¶ 199,
http://www.chr.up.ac.za/images/files/documents/africancases/country/cameroon/Gunme%20and%
200thers%20v%2oCameroon.pdf ("the right to self determination cannot be exercised, in the
absence of proof of massive violation of human rights under the Charter.").
94. Written statement of Russia, ¶ 84, available at http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/files/141/15628.pdf.
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no realistic chance that the latter will reform its conduct. Thus, in the
Qudbec case, the Supreme Court of Canada noted that a "clear case where a
right to external self-determination [i.e., secession]" exists when "a people
is subject to alien subjugation, domination or exploitation outside a colonial
context."9 5 Furthermore, the Court noted the opinion of some scholars that
"the right to self-determination may ground a [remedial] right to unilateral
secession ... when a people is blocked from the meaningful exercise of its
right to self-determination internally."9 6 One or both of these exceptions
applied to Kosovo, where the ethnic Albanian population of that Serbia
province, which formed the overwhelming majority of its inhabitants, had
undergone severe and prolonged abuses at the hands of Serbia. It may also
be the case that one or both exceptions applies to the Kurdish population of
Iraq, which may eventually opt to secede from that country, even if the Iraqi
government does not consent. But it plainly could not be said of the ethnic
Russian population of Crimea.9 7 Accordingly, Crimea was not a case in
which international law would have recognized a right to secession and
independence.
Moreover, the fact that the Crimean secession resulted, not only from
the activities of local Crimean forces, but also from Russia's external
military intervention, strengthens the argument that the secession was void.
In 1983, Security Council Resolution 541 condemned Turkey's recognition
of the purported Republic of North Cyprus. The North Cyprus case bears
some resemblance to the Crimean situation. In both instances, an outside
power intervened militarily in order to protect an ethnic minority from the
(asserted) risk of persecution at the hands of an established government,
supported that minority's efforts at secession, and sought unilaterally to
redraw recognized international frontiers.
95. Qudbec, 2 S.C.R. ¶ 133. The Court pointed out that the exception for that case is rooted
in (among other things) the landmark Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning
Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United
Nations, G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV) (Oct. 24, 1970). After reaffirming the right of self-determination
of peoples, Resolution 2625 stated:
Nothing in the foregoing paragraphs shall be construed as authorizing or encouraging
any action which would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity
or political unity of sovereign and independent States conducting themselves in
compliance with the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples as
described above and thus possessed of a government representing the whole people
belonging to the territory without distinction as to race, color or creed.
96. Qudbec, supra, at ¶ 134.
97. In its written statement to the I.C.J. in the Kosovo Declaration of Independence case,
Russia insisted that the right to "remedial" unilateral secession existed "only in extreme
conditions, where violent acts of discrimination are continuously committed against the people in
question and all possibilities for a resolution of the problem within the existing State have been
exhausted. Secession has been described as a measure of last resort, where the very existence of
the people, or its characteristic features, are in danger." Written statement of Russia, supra, at ¶
87. Nothing approximating to those conditions existed for ethnic Russians in Crimea.
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The fact that Crimea, acting under the authority of its local government,
held a plebiscite in which a majority voted for secession does not matter
under either Ukrainian or international law. 98 To be clear: I am not
contending that the presence of Russian troops in Crimea during the
referendum, or the boycott of the referendum by some non-Russian groups,
tainted the outcome. However hasty and irregular the vote was, I am
prepared to assume that the outcome reflected the wishes at the time of the
majority those who chose to participate in the vote.9 9 But it is insufficient
98. The use of a referendum to buttress the legitimacy of a claim of right to secede has not
been uncommon since the people of the Papal territory of Avignon voted to secede and join
revolutionary France in 1791. See Theodore S. Woolsey, Self-Determination, 13 Am. J. Int'l L.
302 (1919) (reviewing cases). Referenda are still used for that purpose when the government in
place consents to abide by a vote in favor of separate Statehood. This happened, e.g., in the 1993
Eritrean plebiscite to secede from Ethiopia. See Eritrea Ethiopia Claims Commission, Partial
Award, Civilians Claims, Eritrea's Claims 15, 16, 23, & 27-32 at ¶¶ 6-7 (2004), available at
http://www.pca-cpa.org/upload/files/ER%2OPartial%2OAward%2ODec%2004.pdf
But the outcomes of such plebiscites have by no means been generally accepted when the existing
government has not agreed to accept them. The American States of Texas, Virginia and
Tennessee submitted the question of secession from the Union to their citizens at the start of the
Civil War, and majorities voted to secede. Obviously the Lincoln Administration did not consider
itself legally bound by the outcome of those referenda. See MATT QVORTRUP, REFERENDUMS
AND ETHNIC CONFLICT 16-30 (2014) (reviewing cases). Likewise, a Joint Select Committee of
the British Parliament refused to accept the outcome of a two-thirds majority vote in favor of the
secession of Western Australia in a referendum held in that province in April 1933, concluding
that the British Parliament had no jurisdiction to facilitate such a secession. See Thomas
Musgrave, The Western Australian Secessionist Movement, 3 Macquarrie L. J. 95 (2003). ". . ."
Very recently, in November 2014, some 81% of Catalans voted, in a simulated referendum, to
secede from Spain. The Spanish government considers the outcome non-binding. See
Catalonia's Future: Let Them Vote in The Economist (Nov. 15, 2014), available at
http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21 632478-madrid-govemment-should-let-catalans-have-
voteand-then-defeat-separatists. In 2008, the Spanish Constitutional Court held a similar
provincial law calling for a non-binding "consultation" or referendum in the Basque Country to be
unconstitutional, ruling that sovereignty lay with the Spanish people as a whole, rather than with
the voters of the different provinces. See Constitutional Court Judgment 103/2008, of 11
September 2008, available in English translation at
http://www.tribunalconstitucional.es/en/jurisprudencia/restrad/Pages/JCC1032008en.aspx.
In general, then,"for important issues such as independence of the territory... it may be important,
or even essential, to consult the whole electorate." Yves Beigbeder, Referendum, at ¶ 64, in
Oxford Public International Law, available at
http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-el088.
99. It does not follow, and it may not be true, that the outcome of the plebiscite reflected the
considered and deliberate will of the "people" (if they can be so characterized) of Crimea.
According to a Canadian political scientist, Canada's Clarity Act, which is designed to provide for
the lawful secession of a province through the vote of a "clear majority," does not permit the
break-up of Canada merely "by a one-vote majority in a provincial referendum." See Tom
Flanagan, Clarifying the Clarity Act, in The Globe and Mail (July 8, 2011), available at
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/globe-debate/clarifying-the-clarity-act/article586395/. The
extent of the tum-out for the referendum, and perhaps also the size of the majority in favor of
secession, must also be considered. Further, a fair opportunity to debate the proposed secession
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that the Crimeans gave their consent to the secession; it is necessary that
Ukraine have consented.10 0 And Ukraine did not and does not consent to the
loss of Crimea.10 1 "[I]nternational law places great importance on the
territorial integrity of nation states and, by and large, leaves the creation of
a new state to be determined by the domestic law of the existing state of
which the seceding entity presently forms a part. . . . Where, as here,
unilateral secession would be incompatible with the domestic Constitution,
international law is unlikely to accept that conclusion subject to the right of
peoples to self-determination."102
C. Was Russia's annexation of Crimea Valid?
Given that the secession of Crimea was invalid, it follows directly that
Russia's annexation of the peninsula was also illegal and invalid.
Nonetheless, a brief exposition of international law regarding annexation
may be useful.
As with secession, the annexation (perhaps it is better to say, the
merger) of one State or territory by another State can be lawful when both
parties freely consent to it. Thus, the 1997 transfer of sovereignty over
Hong Kong from the UK to China was internationally lawful. The
reunification of the two Germanies in 1990 was also consensual and is
recognized as lawful by the international community. The short-lived
United Arab Republic (1958-1961), a union formed by the merger of Egypt
and Syria, was also legally valid.
Moreover, in the post-1945 period, there have been many actual or
attempted annexations. The international law scholar Eugene Kontorovich
recently listed several such cases.1 03 His list includes Turkey's de facto
annexation of North Cyprus in 1974, Morocco's annexation of Western
Sahara, North Vietnam's incorporation of South Vietnam in 1975,
Indonesia's annexation of East Timor, Armenia's de facto annexation of
parts of Azerbaijan, and Russia's own de facto annexation of parts of
must have been afforded, and the polling must not have been tainted by irregularities or a coercive
atmosphere. It is doubtful whether the Crimean referendum met comparable standards.
100. The Crimean referendum was void and without effect, not only as a matter of general
international law, but also as a matter of Ukraine's own constitutional law. As noted above, the
Constitutional Court of Ukraine ruled the Crimean resolution calling for the referendum to be
unconstitutional. See Judgment of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine on all-Crimean
Referendum (March 14, 2014), English trans. available at
http://mfa.gov.ua/en/news-feeds/foreign-offices-news/1 9573-rishennya-konstitucijnogo-sudu-v-
ukrajini-shhodo-referendumu-v-krimu.
101. See Jesse Eells-Adams, Petro Poroshenko Refuses Loss of Crimea, THE GUARDIAN,
June 8, 2014, http://guardianlv.com/2014/06/petro-poroshenko-refuses-loss-of-crimea/.
102. Qudbec, supra, at ¶ 112.
103. Eugene Kontorovich, The other Crimeas, L.A. TIMES, March 24, 2014,
http://articles.latimes.com/2014/mar/24/opinion/la-oe-kontorovich-crimea-modern-conquests-
20140324.
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Georgia in 2008.104 Other post-War cases include Israel's annexation of
East Jerusalem, the Ethiopian annexation of Eritrea (1961) and India's
annexation of Portuguese Goa (also 1961). Not all of these annexations
have been considered illegal (though some, such as that of East Timor,
undoubtedly were).105 The international community recognizes Vietnam
(including both the former North and South Vietnams) as a unitary
sovereign State. India's conquest of Goa was perhaps considered a
legitimate or excusable act of decolonization. 1 0 6
As a general rule, however, forcible annexations are unlawful and stand
condemned by the international community. 107 The outstanding post-War
example, of course, is the Security Council's condemnation of Iraq in
Resolution 662 (1990), in which the Council decided that Iraq's annexation
of Kuwait "has no legal validity" and was "null and void."10 Subsequently
in Resolution 678 (1990), the Council, acting under its Chapter VII
authority, authorized the United States and other allies of Kuwait to enforce
Resolution 662 and to undo the Iraqi annexation. 109 Those actions by the
Council stand as important precedents for finding forcible annexations to be
illegal. Likewise, Security Council Resolution 267 (1969), among others,
condemned the Israeli annexation of East Jerusalem. 110 These Resolutions
reinforce the norm against forcible annexation. Indeed, that norm can be
traced back at least to the "Stimson doctrine" (1932), named for then-U.S.
Secretary of State Henry Stimson, which declared that the United States
considered that the Japanese conquest and acquisition of Manchuria to have
brought about no change in China's legal title to that territory."' Whether or
not the Stimson doctrine had become customary law by 1945, "[t]he
position now prevailing and fully accepted in international law is that the
use of force is unlawful and, by itself, ineffective to bring about a change of
title."1 1 2 Indeed, the Trial Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal
104. Id.
105. See S.C. Res. 384 (Dec. 22, 1975); G.A. Res. 3485 (Dec. 12, 1975); Sharon Korman,
The Right of Conquest: The Acquisition of Territory by Force in International Law and Practice
281 et seq. (1996); Paul D. Elliott, The East Timor Dispute, 27 INT'L LAW Q. 238 (1978).
106. Cf Case concerning Right of Passage over Indian Territory (Merits), Judgment of 12
April 1960: I.C.J. Reports 1960, p. 6, p. 45.
107. Indeed, when annexation is (as here) the outcome of aggression, it aggravates the
illegality of that aggression. See Namibia (S. W. Africa), supra, separate opinion of Ammoun, J., T
12 at p. 90 ("The aggression committed by South Africa with regard to Namibia is the more
serious in that . . . it has turned into a veritable annexation").
108. S.C. Res. 662 (Aug. 9, 1990).
109. S.C. Res. 678 (Nov. 29, 1990).
110. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 252 (May 21, 1968); see also S.C. Res. 497 (Dec. 17, 1981) (Golan
Heights).
111. See Quincy Wright, The Legal Foundation of the Stimson Doctrine, 8 PACIFIC AFFAIRS
439 (1935).
112. Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain, Merits,
Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2001, p. 40 (separate opinion of Judge Fortier T 37).
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for the Former Yugoslavia declared in 1998 that "the acquisition of territory
by force" was forbidden by a jus cogens norm of international law,
expressly placing it together with the prohibitions on genocide, torture and
slavery.113
True, the Russian annexation of Crimea might be argued to have been
"non-forcible" in that 1) it was supported by secessionist Crimea and 2) any
armed conflict between Russian and Ukrainian forces was limited to non-
existent. But these considerations do not change the legal analysis.In the
Karins case, noted above, the Latvian Constitutional Court recalled the
holding of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg (the IMT) and
other Nuremberg military courts to the effect that Nazi Germany's
annexation of Austria-the Anschluss-was illegal and criminal, despite
being bloodless and despite having the support of the majority of the
Austrian people.1 1 4 As Karins says, the IMT had found that "[t]hese matters,
even if true, are really immaterial for the facts plainly prove that the
methods employed to achieve the object were those of an aggressor. The
ultimate factor was the armed might of Germany ready to be used if any
resistance were encountered." The same is true of the Russian annexation of
Crimea.
PART II: RuSSIA's LEGAL DEFENSES
Putin's Speech
Before we can confidently conclude that Russia violated international
legal standards, however, we must carefully examine Russia's legal
defenses. These can be found in several places. However, it is reasonable to
concentrate on President Putin's extremely interesting speech of March 18
to the Russian Parliament.1 1 5 That speech sets out Russia's legal defenses in
a straightforward but sophisticated way. It obviously benefited from the
advice of the legal experts at Russia's Foreign Ministry. And, coming from
the head of the Russian State, it has a unique authority. Moreover, although
Mr. Putin's speech covers several topics, it is threaded throughout with
references to international law.116 It does not give much attention to the
legality of Russia's annexation - an event that was still in the future when
Mr. Putin spoke. But he does offer interesting arguments on the legality of
Russia's actions under international use of force rules and of the validity of
113. Prosecutor v. Furundzia, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia,
Trial Chamber, Case. No. IT-95-17/1-T (Dec. 10, 1998) at ¶147, available at
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/furundzija/tjug/en/fur-tj981210e.pdf.
114. Karins, supra note 42, ¶ 25.5.
115. Vladimir Putin, President of the Russ., Address by President of the Russian Federation
(March 18, 2014) (transcript available at http://eng.kremlin.ru/news/6889).
116. Id.
No. 1] 151
152 UNIV OF ST THOMAS JOURNAL OFLAW& PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. IX
the Crimean referendum, which had happened two days earlier.
We can identify at least four interwoven but distinct legal arguments in
Mr. Putin's remarks. These are:
1. Crimea belongs to Russia;
2. Russia was acting in defense of endangered nationals and
ethnic kin living in Crimea;
3. Russia was enabling the Crimean people to exercise their right
to self-determination; and
4. The 1999 NATO military intervention in Kosovo created a
precedent for Russia's actions.
Does Crimea belong to Russia?
Mr. Putin's lead argument, not surprisingly given his audience, is that
Crimea belongs to Russia. To show this, he demonstrates the close
historical and current ties that bind Crimea to Russia. ("In people's hearts
and minds, Crimea has always been an inseparable part of Russia.")1 1 7 He
notes that "the total population of the Crimean Peninsula today is 2.2
million people, of whom almost 1.5 million are Russians, 350,000 are
Ukrainians who predominantly consider Russian their native language, and
about 290,000-300,000 are Crimean Tatars, who, as the referendum has
shown, also lean towards Russia.""' And he argues that the transfer of
Crimea in 1954 from the Russian Soviet Republic to the Ukrainian Soviet
Republic was arbitrary, unconstitutional, and made without reference to the
wishes of the Crimean people:
[I]n 1954, a decision was made to transfer Crimean Region to
Ukraine, along with Sevastopol, despite the fact that it was a federal
city. This was the personal initiative of the Communist Party head
Nikita Khrushchev. What stood behind this decision of his - a
desire to win the support of the Ukrainian political establishment or
to atone for the mass repressions of the 1930's in Ukraine - is for
historians to figure out.
What matters now is that this decision was made in clear violation
of the constitutional norms that were in place even then. The
decision was made behind the scenes. Naturally, in a totalitarian
state nobody bothered to ask the citizens of Crimea and Sevastopol.
They were faced with the fact. People, of course, wondered why all
of a sudden Crimea became part of Ukraine. But on the whole - and
117. Id.
118. Id.
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we must state this clearly, we all know it - this decision was treated
as a formality of sorts because the territory was transferred within
the boundaries of a single state. Back then, it was impossible to
imagine that Ukraine and Russia may split up and become two
separate states. However, this has happened.1 1 9
Moreover, Putin contended, Crimea was handed over to Ukraine in
1991 in a similar way, without reference to the wishes of the (mainly
Russian) inhabitants of Crimea:
[W]e have to admit that by launching the sovereignty parade Russia
itself aided in the collapse of the Soviet Union. And as this collapse
was legalised, everyone forgot about Crimea and Sevastopol - the
main base of the Black Sea Fleet. Millions of people went to bed in
one country and awoke in different ones, overnight becoming
ethnic minorities in former Union republics, while the Russian
nation became one of the biggest, if not the biggest ethnic group in
the world to be divided by borders.
Now, many years later, I heard residents of Crimea say that back in
1991 they were handed over like a sack of potatoes. This is hard to
disagree with. And what about the Russian state? What about
Russia? It humbly accepted the situation. This country was going
through such hard times then that realistically it was incapable of
protecting its interests. However, the people could not reconcile
themselves to this outrageous historical injustice. All these years,
citizens and many public figures came back to this issue, saying
that Crimea is historically Russian land and Sevastopol is a Russian
city. 12 0
Putin's arguments, however resonant they might be with his Russian
audience, prove nothing as a matter of international law. 12 1 The
unconstitutionality of the transfer of Crimea to Ukraine under Soviet law
(assuming that it was unconstitutional 1 22) does not invalidate it under
international law. The general rule in international law-applied during the
dissolution of the former Yugoslavia-is that the internal boundaries
between the major units of a federal system become international
119. Id.
120. Putin, supra note 71.
121. Id.
122. The USSR Constitution of 1977 might be interpreted to have ratified the Crimea cession.
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boundaries in the event of the federation's dissolution. Moreover, in the
Yugoslavian case, this was held to be true regardless of the wishes of the
ethnic groups that unexpectedly found themselves to be minorities in the
new situation.123 The same rules would apply to the case of the dissolution
of the USSR.124
Furthermore, although the rights of national minorities to exist, to enjoy
equal rights with national majorities, and even to determine their own
condition are established, existing international law by no means affirms
that they also have a right to separate statehood and territory. 12 5 Indeed, the
principle that pre-existing borders become international borders upon
independence is well established in the I.C.J.'s case law.126 In the Western
Saharal2 7 and Namibial28 cases, the I.C.J. affirmed the principle of self-
determination; but it ruled the principle to be applicable to territories within
former colonial systems, and not (except insofar as they were residents of
the territory) to peoples. Likewise, in the Burkina Faso case, an I.C.J.
Chamber found that the principle of uti possidetis, which "freezes the
territorial title" of a former colony at the moment it achieves independence
to "the territorial base and boundaries left to it by the colonial power," took
priority in the event of any conflict with the principle of self-determination
because of what the Chamber saw as an overriding need "to prevent the
independence and stability of new States being endangered by fratricidal
struggles provoked by the challenging of frontiers following the withdrawal
of the administering power."129 Thus, under the I.C.J.'s decolonization
123. For discussion and critique of this principle as applied in the Yugoslavian context, see
R.J. Delahunty & Antonio F. Perez, The Kosovo Crisis: A Dostoievskian Dialogue on
International Law, Statecraft and Soulcraft, 42 VANDERBILT J. TRANSNAT'L L. 15, 73-86 (2005).
124. Moreover, even if the transfer of Crimea to Ukraine was illegal under Soviet law, Russia
can be said to have ratified it by later treaties.
125. See Malcolm N. Shaw, Peoples, Territorialism and Boundaries, 3 EURO. J. INT'L L. 478,
488-89 (1997) ("It cannot ... be maintained that the current conception of minority rights in
international law includes the right as such to territorial autonomy. Whatever the rights afforded
under international law to individuals, groups, minorities or peoples, these cannot be interpreted to
include rights either to territorial autonomy or sovereignty, without the express consent of the
relevant state. . . . International law is quite clear with regard to the predominance of the need to
respect international boundaries.").
126. Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1975, p. 12; Namibia (S.W. Africa),
Advisory Opinion, I.C.J Reports 1971, p. 16; Frontier Dispute, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1986, p.
554; Case Concerning Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Salvador v. Honduras;
Nicaragua intervening), I.C.J. Reports 1992 p. 351.
127. Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1975, p. 12, ¶ 161 (finding self-
determination extended to the "population" of Western Sahara); id. ¶ 162 (right lay in the "free
and genuine expression of the will of the peoples of the Territory").
128. Namibia (S.W Africa), Advisory Opinion, I.C.J Reports 1971, p. 16, ¶ 52 (self-
determination applied to "non-self-goveming territories").
129. Frontier Dispute, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 554, ¶ 20, ¶ 30. The I.C.J.
subsequently declared that the formulation of the uti possidetis principle in the Burkina-Faso case
was "authoritatively stated." Case Concerning Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El
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cases, "the principle of self-determination of peoples was territorially
defined.... Self-determination ... did not operate ... as a means whereby
each group within the territory had the right in international law to
determine its own political future."1 3 0
Finally, Russia did not object to Ukrainian sovereignty over Crimea in
1991, and it affirmed Ukrainian sovereignty over Crimea several times
thereafter in formal legal documents. Putin makes no reference whatsoever
to those inconvenient facts. Indeed, he seems to acknowledge that during
negotiations with Ukraine in the early 2000s, Russia acknowledged, or was
willing to acknowledge, that Crimea belonged to Ukraine. Taking some
liberties with the historical record, he said:
The then President of Ukraine Mr Kuchma asked me to expedite
the process of delimiting the Russian-Ukrainian border. At that
time, the process was practically at a standstill. Russia seemed to
have recognised Crimea as part of Ukraine, but there were no
negotiations on delimiting the borders. Despite the complexity of
the situation, I immediately issued instructions to Russian
government agencies to speed up their work to document the
borders, so that everyone had a clear understanding that by
agreeing to delimit the border we admitted defacto and dejure that
Crimea was Ukrainian territory, thereby closing the issue.
We accommodated Ukraine not only regarding Crimea, but also on
such a complicated matter as the maritime boundary in the Sea of
Azov and the Kerch Strait. What we proceeded from back then was
that good relations with Ukraine matter most for us and they should
not fall hostage to deadlock territorial disputes. However, we
expected Ukraine to remain our good neighbour, we hoped that
Russian citizens and Russian speakers in Ukraine, especially its
southeast and Crimea, would live in a friendly, democratic and
civilised state that would protect their rights in line with the norms
of international law. (emphasis added)
Here we can see the argument that "Crimea belongs to Russia" melting
into a second and distinct argument: that Russian intervention in Crimea is
justified by the need to protect "Russian citizens and Russian speakers"-a
type of self-defense argument.13 1
Salvador v. Honduras; Nicaragua intervening), I.C.J. Reports 1992 p. 351, T 42.
130. Shaw, Peoples, Territorialism and Boundaries, supra note 72, at 481.
131. Putin, supra note 71.
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Was Russian intervention lawful as a measure to protect endangered
Russians?
Putin's speech raises the question of the legality of armed intervention
on behalf of the nationals of the intervening State who were held hostage-
or otherwise in grave danger-in a State that was unwilling or unable to
protect them. Putin argued that that was, effectively, the situation of
Russian nationals in Crimea. Indeed he even suggested that the Ukrainian
government did not merely stand by as private groups threatened the
Russians of Crimea, but that that government itself actively persecuted
those people:
Time and time again attempts were made to deprive Russians of
their historical memory, even of their language and to subject them
to forced assimilation. Moreover, Russians, just as other citizens of
Ukraine are suffering from the constant political and state crisis that
has been rocking the country for over 20 years...
I would like to reiterate that I understand those who came out on
Maidan with peaceful slogans against corruption, inefficient state
management and poverty. The right to peaceful protest, democratic
procedures and elections exist for the sole purpose of replacing the
authorities that do not satisfy the people. However, those who stood
behind the latest events in Ukraine had a different agenda: they
were preparing yet another government takeover; they wanted to
seize power and would stop short of nothing. They resorted to
terror, murder and riots. Nationalists, neo-Nazis, Russophobes and
anti-Semites executed this coup. They continue to set the tone in
Ukraine to this day.
The new so-called authorities began by introducing a draft law to
revise the language policy, which was a direct infringement on the
rights of ethnic minorities. However, they were immediately
'disciplined' by the foreign sponsors of these so-called politicians.
One has to admit that the mentors of these current authorities are
smart and know well what such attempts to build a purely
Ukrainian state may lead to. The draft law was set aside, but clearly
reserved for the future. Hardly any mention is made of this attempt
now, probably on the presumption that people have a short
memory. Nevertheless, we can all clearly see the intentions of these
ideological heirs of Bandera, Hitler's accomplice during World
War II....
The Crimean Crisis
Those who opposed the coup were immediately threatened with
repression. Naturally, the first in line here was Crimea, the Russian-
speaking Crimea. In view of this, the residents of Crimea and
Sevastopol turned to Russia for help in defending their rights and
lives, in preventing the events that were unfolding and are still
underway in Kiev, Donetsk, Kharkov and other Ukrainian cities.
Naturally, we could not leave this plea unheeded; we could not
abandon Crimea and its residents in distress. This would have been
betrayal on our part.132
Again, however, the argument is unconvincing. First, Putin lumps
together three distinct categories of people who have different statuses
under international law: Russian citizens; ethnic Russians who are citizens
of Ukraine; and Russian speakers. At most, international law would permit
a limited armed intervention by Russia to protect its own nationals,
including, it may be, those who were dual nationals of Russia and
Ukraine.133 But international law, most assuredly, does not permit
intervention on behalf of ethnic kindred who are non-nationals of the
intervening Power (let alone those who merely speak its language), even if
they are endangered.
As the British legal scholar D.W. Bowett-a staunch defender of the
right of protective intervention-admitted
[C]itizenship affords the basis of the state's right to protection. In
the absence of this nexus of nationality or citizenship it is difficult
to see how protection can be brought within the concept of self-
defence, for it is because of their nationality that persons can be
regarded as a part of the state and, therefore, their protection be
undertaken by the state as self-protection.1 3 4
Bowett also requires that legitimate protective intervention be designed
to meet an "actual or imminent danger" (which is generally true of any
legitimate form of self-defense).1 3 5 On that requirement, Mr. Putin's
reference to a draft language law-which, as he noted, was not passed-is
simply irrelevant, since whatever "danger" that law might have imposed (if
132. Id.
133. Caution is required here, however. Having a particular nationality under the domestic
law of a State does not automatically entail having the same nationality for every purpose of
international law, including the right to be protected by that State. See Nottebohm Case (second
phase), Judgment of April 6 h, 1955: I.C.J. Reports 1955, p. 4, p. 21.
134. Bowett, supra, at 119.
135. Bowett, supra, at 120.
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enacted) was neither actual nor imminent.1 3 6
Is it generally lawful to intervene militarily to rescue endangered nationals
abroad?
Furthermore, the legality of armed intervention even to protect one's
own endangered nationals abroad has long been disputed. In the Don
Pacifico Affair of 1850, the British Foreign Minister Lord Palmerston sent a
squadron of the Royal Navy to seize property in Athens in compensation
for the damage done by a Greek mob to the home of one Don Pacifico
while local police looked on.1 3 7 Don Pacifico was the Portuguese consul in
Athens but had been born in Gibraltar and was therefore a British subject.
Don Pacifico had been unable to secure justice from the Greek government
and appealed to Britain for help. In the debate in Parliament over his
actions, Palmerston said: "a British subject, in whatever land he may be,
shall feel confident that the watchful eye and the strong arm of England,
will protect him against injustice and wrong."1 3 8 But Palmerston's doctrine,
which seemed high-handed even in the age of "gunboat diplomacy," is
hardly the recognized rule of international law today.
How should we evaluate the armed intervention by one State into the
territory of another for the sole purpose of rescuing innocent, non-
combatant nationals of the intervening State who are being held hostage in
the other State, and that State, though not itself the hostage-taker, is unable
or unwilling to rescue them from their captivity? Should this be considered
a lawful form of self-defense under Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, or
otherwise authorized by international law? Or an unlawful act of
aggression, as is arguably the case under GA Res. 3314?13 9 Or does it,
perhaps, fall under some third category?1 4 0
136. Putin also neglected to mention that under a 2012 Ukrainian law, regions in Ukraine with
significant Russian populations are allowed to use Russian to conduct official government
business. The attempt in the early days following President Yanukovych's removal from office to
repeal the law, to which Putin referred, was unsuccessful. These facts hardly show official
discrimination against Russian speakers; rather the opposite.
137. For accounts of the affair, see Geoffrey Hicks, Don Pacifico, Democracy, and Danger:
The Protectionist Party Critique of British Foreign Policy, 1850-1852, 26 INT'L HIST. REV., 515
(2004); Dolphus Whitten, Jr., The Don Pacifico Affair, 48 The Historian 255 (1986).
138. Hansard CXII [3d Ser.] (June 25, 1850), available at
http://www.historyhome.co.uk/polspeech/foreign.htm.
139. Note that the Resolution says that "territory of a State shall not be violated by being the
object, even temporarily, of military occupation or of other measures of force taken by another
State in contravention of the Charter." If rescue operations are permissible self-defense under Art.
51, they would be consistent with the Charter, and hence not necessarily acts of aggression.
140. For an excellent overview of the debate, see Tom Ruys, The Protection of Nationals'
Doctrine Revisited, 13 J. CONFLICT SECURITY LAW 233 (2008). A valuable earlier contribution,
arguing for a limited right of intervention to protect endangered nationals abroad, is Sir Humphrey
Waldock, The Regulation of the Use of Force by Individual States in International Law, (1952-II)
81 RECEUIL DES COURS 451, 467.
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Consider the case of the hostage rescue operation that Israeli armed
forces carried out in 1976 at Entebbe Airport in Uganda.1 4 1 A group of
hijackers acting for the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine
captured an Air France plane bound from Israeli to France and forced it to
land down (eventually) at Entebbe, where they held some 104 Israeli
nationals, including crew and passengers, as hostages, threatening to kill
them unless Israel and other Western countries released some 153 terrorists
held in prison. The government of Uganda under President Idi Amin
apparently did nothing to rescue the hostages or to prevent their captors
from carrying out their threat. An Israeli commando group forced its way
into the Entebbe Airport, rescuing nearly all of the hostages and returning
them to safety in Israel. In the exchange of fire, several Ugandan troops,
hijackers, and hostages were killed.
The Security Council debated the legality of the Israeli commando
operation. Two draft resolutions were put before the Council, both of them
condemning Israel's action. One draft was offered by the U.S. and the U.K.,
the other by three African States. The Chairman of the Organization of
African Unity condemned Israel's operation as an "act of aggression."
Interestingly, however, the Security Council adopted neither the U.S.-
U.K. draft resolution nor the alternative African draft. Member States
seemed to have been torn between two conflicting impulses. One was to
condemn Israel for violating Uganda's territorial integrity. The other was to
accept that a State had the right to use military force if that was absolutely
necessary to rescue its own innocent, non-combatant nationals from a life-
threatening hostage situation, at least when the invaded State was unwilling
to make its own rescue attempt or was cooperating with the hostage-takers,
provided that the rescue operation was designed to keep casualties to a
minimum and did not result in even the temporary occupation of the
invaded State.
A more recent case is the United States' abortive military effort in 1980
to rescue American diplomatic personnel held hostage for months by
Iranian militants surrounding the U.S. Embassy in Tehran.1 4 2 The I.C.J.
commented on this intervention in its 1980 opinion in The Tehran Embassy
Case. While insisting on the gravity of Iran's breach of international law in
failing to protect the Embassy and its staff (diplomatic personnel enjoy a
141. For contrasting analyses, compare Leonard M. Salter, Commando Coup at Entebbe:
Humanitarian Intervention or Barbaric Aggression?, 11 INT'L LAW. 331 (1977) with Adeoye A.
Akinsanya, The Entebbe Rescue Mission: A Case of Aggression, 34 PAKISTAN HORIZON 12
(1981). See also Eleanor C. McDowell, United Nations: Security Council Debate and Draft
Resolutions Concerning the Operation to Rescue Hijacked Hostages at the Entebbe Airport, 15
INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1224 (1976).
142. United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1980,
p. 3 .
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heightened right to protection by the host State), the Court also expressed
its "concern" over the American "incursion" into Iranian territory. 143
However, the Court also pointed out that "neither the question of the
legality of the operation of 24 April 1980, under the Charter of the United
Nations and under general international law, nor any possible question of
responsibility flowing from it, is before the Court."1 4 4  Accordingly the
Court did not review the legality of the U.S. rescue operation. 145
The legality of both the Israeli commando operation at Entebbe and the
American rescue attempt in Tehran thus remain clouded. But Israel
reasonably interpreted the failure of a condemnatory resolution to pass as a
vindication. Moreover, since the attacks of September 11, 2001, the United
States and other nations have become more inclined to support protective
military operations against terrorists on behalf of their own nationals.
Should we consider actions like the Entebbe incident to be "acts of
aggression"? Or would that be taking the side of the stronger, Western
nations in a longstanding dispute they have had with the weaker nations of
the global South? 1 4 6
The debate in the Security Council over Israel's rescue operation at
Entebbe airport indicated that the question is still open. But Israel's
operation was limited to rescuing Israeli nationals from an immediate, life-
threatening danger. It did not result in any further military operations in
Uganda, nor in the acquisition of any Uganda territory. Russia's
143. Id.
144. Id. ¶¶ 93-94. Likewise, Russia cited the protection of its allegedly endangered nationals
in Georgia as a justification for armed intervention into that nation. See Library of Congress,
Global Legal Research Center, Russian Federation: Legal Aspects of War in Georgia 9-10 (2008),
http://www.loc.gov/law/help/legal-aspects-of-war/russian-georgia-war.php; Gareth Evans, Russia,
Georgia, and the Responsibility to Protect, 1 AMSTERDAM LAW FORUM 25 (2012),
http://amsterdamlawfomm.org/article/view/58/115. The I.C.J. subsequently declined in 2010 to
rule on Russia's legal argument.
145. An older but similar intervention is also interesting. That is the Western intervention
during the Boxer Rebellion in 1900, which occurred in this very city. That too was a military
intervention for the purpose of rescuing endangered nationals abroad when the host government
was unable or unwilling to protect them. An expeditionary force of British, German, Russian,
American, Italian, French, Austro-Hungarian and Japanese troops lifted a 55-day siege of
Beijing's legation quarter and rescued their diplomatic personnel within it. The expeditionary
forces then engaged in violence and looting against Chinese people and property. The Chinese
cultural memory is far more critical of these incidents from the prevailing Western one, and
rightly so. See Remembering the Boxer Uprising: A Righteous Fist, THE ECONOMIST (Dec. 16,
2010), http://www.economist.com/node/17723014?.
146. C.f The Corfu Channel Case, Judgment of April 9 h, 1949: I.C.J. Reports 1949, p. 4, p.
35 ("The Court can only regard the alleged right of intervention as the manifestation of a policy of
force, such as has, in the past, given rise to most serious abuses and such as cannot, whatever be
the present defects in international organization, find a place in international law. Intervention is
perhaps still less admissible in the particular form it would take here; for, from the nature of
things, it would be reserved for the most powerful States, and might easily lead to perverting the
administration of international justice itself.").
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intervention in Crimea, by contrast, resulted in the annexation of the
entirety of that territory. If the legality of Israel's intervention was
debatable, therefore, that of Russia's intervention is less so. Moreover, even
accepting the characterization of Russia's intervention as a form of "self-
defense," it did not meet the requirement of proportionality that attaches,
legally, to any valid self-defense.1 4 7 Russia could simply have evacuated
any endangered Russian nationals (as Israel did at Entebbe), or thrown a
protective cordon sanitaire around them until the immediate danger had
passed.1 4 8 Instead it forcibly occupied, and then annexed, the entire territory.
But, as legal scholar Tom Ruys has shown, over the course of several
decades "debates in the Security Council unequivocally certify that that,
unless the host State consents or the Security Council authorizes the
operation, attacks against nationals abroad or threats thereof can never
justify a prolonged or very large-scale military presence. "149
Is military intervention to protect non-citizens who are ethnic kin lawful?
Consider also the consequences if international law permitted armed
intervention to protect, not the intervenor's nationals, but its ethnic kindred,
if the latter were at risk of persecution or violence. On that understanding, it
is hard to see why Hitler's interventions to protect the ethnic German
inhabitants of the Sudetenland in Czechoslovakia or of Poland were
wrongful, especially since at least some of their claims that they had
suffered official discrimination were plausible."o In the contemporary
147. On the applicability of the proportionality requirement to this type of case, see Bowett,
supra, at 118; see also Nicaragua, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1986, ¶ 176 (requirement of
proportionality is part of customary law of self-defense); David Kretzmer, The Inherent Right to
Self-Defence and Proportionality in Jus Ad Bellum, 24 Eur. J. Int'l L. 235, 270-2 (2013)
(discussing proportionality requirement in context of imminent attacks).
148. "There is no exception in [U.N.Charter] Article 2(4) permitting armed invasion to
safeguard lives which could be safeguarded by removing the persons from the territory in which
they are endangered." Louis Henkin, The Invasion of Panama Under International Law: A Gross
Violation, 29 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 293, 297 (1991).
149. Ruys, 'Protection ofNationals, 'supra note 85, at 29.
150. See Rights of Minorities in Upper Silesia (Ger. v. Pol.), 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 15
(Apr. 26), at ¶ 128
("The Court considers that a generally hostile attitude on the part of the authorities in regard to
minority schools, an attitude manifested by more or less arbitrary action, is not compatible with
the principle laid down in Article 68. The Court, moreover, has found nothing in the documents
and statements submitted in the course of the proceedings which would show that Poland
questions, as not well founded, Germany's contention that any measure singling out the minority
schools to their detriment is incompatible with the equal treatment guaranteed by Article 68. On
the other hand, the Court does not intend to express an opinion on the question whether the
attitude of the authorities has, in fact, been discriminatory, for it has not been asked for a decision
in regard to any concrete measure alleged to be of this character.")
http://www.worldcourts.com/pcij/eng/decisions/1928.04.26_upper silesia.htm; see also Settlers of
German Origin in Poland, Advisory Opinion, 1923 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 6 (Sept. 10),
http://www.worldcourts.com/pcij/eng/decisions/1923.09.10_germansettlers.htm.
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world, many large ethnic diasporas exist, and several of them have suffered
persecution or violence in the countries of which they are now nationals -
Russians in Estonia"'; Chinese in Indonesia (late 1990s)1 5 2 and, recently,
Vietnam (2014)153; and (before their expulsion in 1972) Indians in
Uganda.1 5 4 Are we to agree that Russia therefore has a legal right to invade
Estonia and China to invade Vietnam, or that India might have lawfully
invaded Idi Amin's Uganda? The precedent that the Russian invasion of
Crimea has set is highly destabilizing, and might readily be emulated by
other major powers, not least China."'
Moreover, as UK Foreign Minister Hague pointed out, Russia did not
avail itself of the peaceful methods for the protection of minority
populations that were available to it under various international agreements.
Russia's failure to invoke those procedures undercuts Putin's argument that
armed intervention was needed to avert the danger to Russian nationals.
Was there an imminent risk to Russians in Crimea?
Putin also seems to have greatly exaggerated both the gravity and the
imminence of any danger to Russian nationals, ethnic Russians, or Russian
speakers in Crimea. By and large, relations between Ukrainians and
Russians, both in Crimea and elsewhere in Ukraine, have been
characterized by good will and mutual toleration since at least 1991.156
While a significant number, albeit still a minority, of the ethnic Russians in
Ukraine might indeed prefer to live under Russian rather than Ukrainian
rule,15 7 many or most of these separatists seem to be influenced primarily by
151. See Estonia Human Rights, Amnesty International, http://www.amnestyusa.org/our-
work/countries/europe/estonia.
152. JEMMA PURDEY, ANTI-CHINESE VIOLENCE ININDONESIA, 1996 1999 (2006).
153. See Jonathan Kaiman, Anti-China riots turn deadly in Vietnam, THE GUARDIAN (May
15, 2014),
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/may/15/anti-china-riots-turn-deadly-in-vietnam.
154. See Vishnu D. Sharma and F. Wooldridge, Some Legal Questions Arising from the
Expulsion ofthe Ugandan Asians, 23 INT'L & COMP. L.Q 397 (1974).
155. "Potential targets for such an initiative would include Malaysia and Indonesia, where
there are sizeable Chinese minority communities and a history of discrimination .... One reason
China advanced for its 1979 invasion of Vietnam was the ill-treatment of the ethnic Chinese
minority." TIMOTHY BEARDSON, STUMBLING GIANT: THE THREATS TO CHINA'S FUTURE 265
(2013).
156. Thus, according to a 2007 survey, only 0.5% of the respondents describe themselves as
belonging to a group that faces discrimination by language. See Evhen Golovakha, Andriy
Gorbachyk, Natalia Panina, "Ukraine and Europe: Outcomes of International Comparative
Sociological Survey", Kiev, Institute of Sociology of NAS of Ukraine, 2007, ISBN 978-966-02-
4352-1, pp. 133-135 in Section: "9. Social discrimination and migration" (pdf)- [Note: I am not
sure a citation is needed. This one comes from the wiki article Russians in Ukraine. I have not
been able to verify the survey cited. RJD]
157. According to a survey by the Pew Institute, "A broad majority of Ukrainians say their
country should remain a unified state (77%). Fewer than two-in-ten (14%) believe that regions
that want to leave should be allowed to secede. Support for maintaining Ukraine's borders is
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economic considerations. Russian citizenship provides pensions and other
governmental benefits that Ukraine currently cannot afford. Nostalgia for
life under the Soviet Union seems to be another important factor
influencing ethnic Russian separatists. But neither of these influences
equates to fear of oppression by the Ukrainian government or Ukrainian
nationalists.
For Russia to be in a position to justify its intervention as a permissible
exercise of the right of self-defense, however, it would have to show that
nothing short of force could have afforded its "endangered" nationals
protection. The use of force, in other words, would had to have been a last
resort. So, e.g., the Chatham House Principles on the Use of Force in Self-
Defence declares that "[f]orce may be used in self-defence only when this is
necessary to bring an attack to an end, or to avert an imminent attack. There
must be no practical alternative to the proposed use of force that is likely to
be effective in ending or averting the attack."' But when Russia intervened
militarily in Crimea, it deliberately choose not to use the diplomatic
methods that seemed available to it, and likely to be effective, in resolving
its dispute with Ukraine.
Was the Russian intervention a permissible means of assisting the Crimean
people to achieve self-determination?
Also woven into Mr. Putin's argument is the claim that Russia was
acting lawfully in order to promote the Crimean people's right of self-
determination. He said:
First, we had to help create conditions so that the residents of
Crimea for the first time in history were able to peacefully express
their free will regarding their own future. However, what do we
hear from our colleagues in Western Europe and North America?
They say we are violating norms of international law. Firstly, it's a
good thing that they at least remember that there exists such a thing
as international law - better late than never.
Secondly, and most importantly - what exactly are we violating?
especially widespread in the country's west (93%). A majority of east Ukraine also wants to be
one country (70%), including nearly six-in-ten Russian-only speakers (58%). Still, a significant
minority of Russian-only speakers in the east support allowing regions to secede (27%)." Pew
Research Center, Ukraine: Desire for Unity Amid Worries about Political Leadership, Ethnic
Conflict (May 8, 2014), http://www.pewglobal.org/2014/05/08/chapter-1-ukraine-desire-for-unity-
amid-worries-about-political-leadership-ethnic-conflict/.
158. Elizabeth Wilmshurst, Principles of International Law on the Use of Force by States in
Self-Defence 7(Chatham House, ILP Working Paper No. 05/01, 2005).
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True, the President of the Russian Federation received permission
from the Upper House of Parliament to use the Armed Forces in
Ukraine. However, strictly speaking, nobody has acted on this
permission yet. Russia's Armed Forces never entered Crimea; they
were there already in line with an international agreement. True, we
did enhance our forces there; however - this is something I would
like everyone to hear and know - we did not exceed the personnel
limit of our Armed Forces in Crimea, which is set at 25,000,
because there was no need to do so.
Next. As it declared independence and decided to hold a
referendum, the Supreme Council of Crimea referred to the United
Nations Charter, which speaks of the right of nations to self-
determination. Incidentally, I would like to remind you that when
Ukraine seceded from the USSR it did exactly the same thing,
almost word for word. Ukraine used this right, yet the residents of
Crimea are denied it. Why is that? 159
We have seen earlier that the General Assembly definition of
"aggression" arguably includes a carve-out for those armed interventions
intended to liberate an oppressed people from colonialist or racist r6gimes.
But the apparent carve-out is much more limited, however, because it
requires that any such intervention accord with the United Nations Charter,
which in turn means that it must be authorized under Chapter VII by the
Security Council. Thus, Russia cannot find legal coverage for its
intervention under that article of Resolution 3314.
Moreover, the I.C.J. rulings we have examined establish that it is a
Charter violation (of Article 2(4)) for a State to intervene militarily against
a State on behalf of insurgent or rebel groups. These rulings appear to
extend even to cases in which the insurgents or rebels are seeking national
independence from a colonial power. Hence, even if Ukraine were-
implausibly-regarded as a "colonial power" in relation to the Crimeans,
that would not create a legal right for Russia to intervene on their behalf.
Was Kosovo a "Precedent"?
Finally, Mr. Putin referred several times to what he called "the Kosovo
precedent" - meaning by that, the events beginning with the NATO air war
against Serbia in 1999 (which was not authorized by the Security Council),
the subsequent occupation of Kosovo by NATO forces after the Serbian
surrender (which was authorized by Security Council Resolution 1244 of
159. Putin, supra note 71.
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1999), and the secession and declaration of independence of Kosovo from
Serbia in 2008, which was strongly supported by NATO and the EU, and
resisted, unsuccessfully, by Russia and Serbia. 1 60 Thus, Putin spoke of:
[T]he well-known Kosovo precedent - a precedent our western
colleagues created with their own hands in a very similar situation,
when they agreed that the unilateral separation of Kosovo from
Serbia, exactly what Crimea is doing now, was legitimate and did
not require any permission from the country's central authorities.
Pursuant to Article 2, Chapter 1 of the United Nations Charter, the
UN International Court agreed with this approach and made the
following comment in its ruling of July 22, 2010, and I quote: "No
general prohibition may be inferred from the practice of the
Security Council with regard to declarations of independence," and
"General international law contains no prohibition on declarations
of independence." Crystal clear, as they say.
I do not like to resort to quotes, but in this case, I cannot help it.
Here is a quote from another official document: the Written
Statement of the United States America of April 17, 2009,
submitted to the same UN International Court in connection with
the hearings on Kosovo. Again, I quote: "Declarations of
independence may, and often do, violate domestic legislation.
However, this does not make them violations of international law."
End of quote. They wrote this, disseminated it all over the world,
had everyone agree and now they are outraged. Over what? The
actions of Crimean people completely fit in with these instructions,
as it were. For some reason, things that Kosovo Albanians (and we
have full respect for them) were permitted to do, Russians,
Ukrainians and Crimean Tatars in Crimea are not allowed. Again,
one wonders why.
We keep hearing from the United States and Western Europe that
Kosovo is some special case. What makes it so special in the eyes
of our colleagues? It turns out that it is the fact that the conflict in
Kosovo resulted in so many human casualties. Is this a legal
argument? The ruling of the International Court says nothing about
this. This is not even double standards; this is amazing, primitive,
blunt cynicism. One should not try so crudely to make everything
160. Peter Beaumont, Kosovo's Independence is Legal, UN Court Rules, The Guardian (Jul.
22, 2010), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/jul/22/kosovo-independence-un-ruling.
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suit their interests, calling the same thing white today and black
tomorrow. According to this logic, we have to make sure every
conflict leads to human losses. 161
To begin with, let us note that Serbia brought suit in 1999 in the I.C.J.
against the NATO States that were involved in the Kosovo campaign to
challenge the legality of NATO's use of force against it.162 The I.C.J.
declined to reach the merits of Serbia's lawsuit on jurisdictional grounds
(by finding, essentially, that Serbia was not a member of the United Nations
at the time of filing suit, and thus not qualified under the I.C.J. Statute to
bring it). 163 Consequently, we do not have a formal holding from the I.C.J.
that the NATO intervention violated international use of force rules. 164
(Likewise, in Bancovid v. Belgium (2001), the Grand Chamber European
Court of Human Rights refused, on jurisdictional grounds, to entertain a
private lawsuit against some of the European NATO members involved in
the Kosovo campaign.) 165 Nonetheless, I believe that Mr. Putin is correct in
thinking that the NATO intervention violated current international law,
including the Charter.
But that stipulation does nothing to help Putin's legal argument.
Certainly, "Kosovo" is not a "precedent" for the legality of any later
intervention: by Mr. Putin's own lights, the Kosovo intervention was
illegal. Nor does "Kosovo" establish, by State practice, a new norm of
"humanitarian intervention" in customary international law: most NATO
members, including the United States, have not made any such claim. (As
Putin says, they regard "Kosovo" as "unique" - which is to say, they do not
regard it as precedent-setting.) 166 Nor has Russia ever argued that "Kosovo"
created a new customary norm in international law: to repeat, Putin
considers the Western intervention in Kosovo to have been illegal.
Furthermore, even if "Kosovo" were a legal "precedent," it would be a
readily distinguishable one. NATO's intervention took place against a
background of extremely violent human rights violations by the Serbian
government against the ethnic Albanian population of Kosovo (a Serbian
province), including mass displacements of those Albanians from their
homes and work places. 167 By contrast, there was no remotely comparable
161. Address by President of the Russian Federation (March 2014).
162. ICJ Dismisses Belgrade Genocide Claims Against NATO States, EURACTIV (Dec. 17,
2004) http://www.euractiv.com/enlargement/icj-dismisses-belgrade-genocide-news-212995.
163. Id.
164. See, e.g., Legality of Use of Force, Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports
2004, p. 1160, TT 45, 78.
165. Bancovie v. Belgium, app.no.52207/99, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2001),
http:/ihudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-22099#{"itemid":["001-22099"]}.
166. Putin, supra note 71.
167. See Delahunty & Perez, supra note 70, at 31-2, 91-2.
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pattern of human rights abuses by Ukraine against Crimea's ethnic
Russians. While the purpose of NATO's intervention falls far short of
showing its legality, it would certainly be reasonable to consider NATO's
legal violations in Kosovo much less gross than Russia's in Crimea.
Putin's invocation of the I.C.J.'s opinion in the Kosovo Declaration of
Independence Case is also off point. 1 68 In that opinion, the I.C.J. severely
restricted the scope of its answer to the question the General Assembly had
put to it: "Is the unilateral declaration of independence by the Provisional
Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo in accordance with international
law?" 169 The Court left unresolved the more fascinating issues posed by the
case and argued in the briefs, including the questions of the scope of the
principle of the self-determination of peoples and the legality of remedial
secession. Nor did the Court take the opportunity to affirm that the question
of Kosovo's declaration of independence was somehow sui generis, not
governed by general international law and therefore to be decided
pragmatically. Instead the Court merely affirmed that general international
law allows for declarations of independence (as it manifestly does). That
limited holding has no bearing whatsoever on the legality of Russia's
intervention in Crimea, a little bearing on the legality of Crimea's purported
secession.170
In essence, Putin's use of the "Kosovo precedent" amounts to what is
called a Tu quoque argument: that a State is justified or excused in doing an
otherwise illegal or criminal act if its adversary has done the same kind of
act. Put simply: the pot has the right to call the kettle black. But the
illegality of NATO's intervention in Kosovo does nothing to show the
legality of Russia's actions in Crimea. If anything, the illegality of NATO's
conduct confirms the illegality of Russia's.
International courts have been very clear that the illegality of one
State's action does not justify or excuse illegal action by another.1 7 1 For
instance, in the Tehran Embassy Case, the I.C.J., after noting the possible
illegality of the failed U.S. rescue attempt, went on to say that that question
had "no bearing on the evaluation" of the Iranian government's conduct that
was the subject of the suit.17 2 And in its 2000 decision in the Kupreskic
Case, the Trial Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia wrote:
[A]lthough tu quoque was raised as a defence in war crimes trials
168. Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in
Respect ofKosovo, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 2010, p. 403.
169. Id. at 407.
170. See Arp, supra.
171. I set apart the special question of "reprisals." For a succinct analysis, see Frits
Kalshoven, Reprisal, Crimes of War, http://www.crimesofwar.org/a-z-guide/reprisal/.
172. Tehran Embassy Case, supra note 84, at ¶ 94.
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following the Second World War, it was universally rejected. The
US Military Tribunal in the High Command trial, for instance,
categorically stated that under general principles of law, an accused
does not exculpate himself from a crime by showing that another
has committed a similar crime, either before or after the
commission of the crime by the accused. Indeed, there is in fact no
support either in State practice or in the opinions of publicists for
the validity of such a defence.1 7 3
Even Putin is right in claiming that the Western States have been
hypocritical-and they have-Russia is no less hypocritical. If Russia truly
believed in the right of peoples to declare their independence, secede from a
larger union, and form their own State, then why has Russia-particularly
under Putin-obstinately resisted Chechnya's demand for independence
from the Russian Federation? In 2007, Mr. Putin charged Chechnyan
President Ramzan Kadyrov with the task of ending the insurgency in that
region.17 Thereafter, according to a report in 2009 in The New York Times,
Mr. Kadyrov moved with speed and brutality, killing rebel leaders
while also granting amnesty to separatist fighters in exchange for
their loyalty. Human rights groups have accused his government of
employing kidnapping, torture and extrajudicial executions to meet
these ends.1 7 5
I have devoted considerable attention to Mr. Putin's address to the
Duma, partly because it raises several difficult and fascinating questions of
international law, partly because the events it discusses are so fresh in our
minds, partly because it comes from such a prominent authority, and partly
because it shows how the language of international law locks into the grand
strategy-military, diplomatic, economic as well as legal-of a
contemporary Great Power. However, considering Putin's remarks simply
as an extended legal argument, I must conclude that it is a failure.
Finally, let me observe that the Russian intervention in Crimea and its
annexation of that peninsula provides a clear instance of preventive war.
Mr. Putin all but admits this. He said:
173. Prosecutor v. Kupreskic et al., Case No.: IT-95-16-T, Judgment, ¶ 516 (Int'l Crim. Trib.
For the Former Yugoslavia Jan. 14, 2000), available at
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/kupreskic/tjug/en/kup-tj000114e.pdf
174. Michael Schwartz, Russia Ends Operations in Chechnya, THE N.Y. TIMEs, April 16,
2009, available athttp://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/17/world/europe/17chechnya.html?_r=0.
175. Id.
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[W]e have already heard declarations from Kiev about Ukraine
soon joining NATO. What would this have meant for Crimea and
Sevastopol in the future? It would have meant that NATO's navy
would be right there in this city of Russia's military glory, and this
would create not an illusory but a perfectly real threat to the whole
of southern Russia. These are things that could have become reality
were it not for the choice the Crimean people made. 17 6
Sevastopol, remember, is the base for Russia's Black Sea fleet. Fearing
Ukraine's admission into NATO-which would have meant that Sevastopol
was on the soil of a NATO member and that the Russian base would have
been surrounded by NATO forces-Putin struck preemptively to take
Crimea and, with it, Sevastopol. Now preventive wars are still with us; they
may indeed be as common as they ever were. But, dejure, they are widely
considered illegal.
The conclusion seems inescapable: Russia's course of conduct in the
Crimea flagrantly violated international law. Ironically, however, both
before and after the Crimean Crisis, Mr. Putin has repeatedly emphasized
the importance of international law to his conception of the emerging world
order. In a notable address to the Valdai Club on October 25, 2014 he
stated:
The Cold War ended, but it did not end with the signing of a peace
treaty with clear and transparent agreements on respecting existing
rules or creating new rules and standards. This created the
impression that the so-called 'victors' in the Cold War had decided
to pressure events and reshape the world to suit their own needs and
interests. If the existing system of international relations,
international law and the checks and balances in place got in the
way of these aims, this system was declared worthless, outdated
and in need of immediate demolition....
We have entered a period of differing interpretations and deliberate
silences in world politics. International law has been forced to
retreat over and over by the onslaught of legal nihilism. Objectivity
and justice have been sacrificed on the altar of political expediency.
Arbitrary interpretations and biased assessments have replaced
legal norms. At the same time, total control of the global mass
media has made it possible when desired to portray white as black
176. President Vladimir Putin, Address by President of the Russian Federation (Mar. 18,
2014).
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and black as white....
I will add that international relations must be based on international
law, which itself should rest on moral principles such as justice,
equality and truth.177
Surely no commentary on these remarks is necessary.
PART III: WHAT REMEDIES ARE AVAILABLE?
Many people would naturally assume that our mature and many-sided
legal r6gime for regulating and criminalizing interstate acts of aggression
must include provisions for remedying aggression when it occurs. It must
be designed, they might think, to deter or to punish aggression, not only to
prevent it. And you will be right: international law provides a variety of
means by which to respond to acts of aggression. But are these means
effective? At least in a case like Russia's invasion, conquest, and annexation
of Crimea, they are not. And that conclusion invites a very pessimistic view
of the usefulness of international law as a method for securing world peace.
We can identify at least four ways in which the international legal
system provides for lawful responses to Russia's acts of aggression. The
first is political and military; the other three are judicial.
Let us consider them in turn.
Political-military remedies
Individual or collective self-defense
Article 51 of the United Nations Charter permits a State that has been
the object of an "armed attack" to defend itself. 178 Not all cross-border
incursions of foreign troops rise to the level of an "armed attack," but in
light of what we have seen, one would be fully justified in finding that
Russia's intervention in Crimea-which involved, not merely, troop
movements across the Ukrainian border, but also the use or threat of using
those troops to attack Ukrainian military forces in Crimea-constituted an
"armed attack" that Ukraine would have been entitled to repel in a
counterattack. To be sure, any countermeasures taken by Ukraine would
have had to be "proportionate" to Russian attack; and Ukraine might have
been obliged to desist from its self-defense once the Security Council, in the
177. Vinyardsaker, Putin's speech at the Valdai Club - full transcript, (Oct. 15, 2009),
http://vineyardsaker.blogspot.com/2O14/1O/putins-speech-at-valdai-club-full.html.
178. U.N. Charter art. 51, available at
http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter7.shtml.
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language of Article 51, had "taken measures necessary to maintain
international peace and security."17 9 But of course no self-defensive
counterattack happened, for the simple reason that the military forces at
Ukraine's disposal were much weaker than their Russian opponents, less
numerous, less well-equipped, and thoroughly demoralized.8 0 Ukraine's
legal right to individual self-defense was empty.
Article 51 also permits collective self-defense.' Thus, it would have
been lawful for an ally, or coalition of allies, of Ukraine to have intervened
in her self-defense. NATO or other Western forces, e.g., might have been
deployed into Crimea to protect it against the Russian invasion. The U.S.-
led intervention in Kuwait in 1991 is a recent precedent for such an
operation. But collective self-defense also did not occur.
There were at least two kinds of reasons for the West's non-
intervention: legal and non-legal.
Legally, the West was not bound to defend Crimea. Ukraine is not a
party to the NATO Treaty, although its admission into NATO (as Mr. Putin
emphasized) was being considered. Furthermore, although both the U.S.
and the U.K. had extended security assurances to Ukraine in the 1994
Budapest memorandums, they had not legally committed themselves to the
defense of Ukraine whenever it was the victim of aggression or "armed
attacks" by another State.
Non-legally, neither the U.S. nor the E.U. had much incentive to defend
Crimea. First, the E.U. has substantial ties to Russia in terms of trade,
investment, finance, and energy policy. London, one of the world's leading
financial centers, is heavily dependent on Russian capital. And Germany,
among other E.U. nations, depends on Russian energy supplies. Second,
both the U.S. and the E.U. have still not recovered from the financial crisis
of 2008. Given their still fragile economies, neither the U.S. nor the EU
wanted to undertake the costs of war with Russia. Even more, the costs of
defending the whole of Ukraine from Russia, eliminating any pro-Russian
insurgencies there, and administering Ukraine for an indefinite period (as
NATO and the E.U. had done for Kosovo) would have been staggering.
179. Id.
180. "[N]otwithstanding President Obama's references to Russia's weakness, Russia has an
impressive superiority in conventional forces vis-A-vis Ukraine and in Central Europe and a
roughly ten-to-one superiority in tactical nuclear weapons, of which it has an estimated two
thousand, compared to about two hundred deployed in Europe for the United States. Russian
military planners consider tactical nuclear weapons an important component in the overall balance
of forces and are preparing integrated war plans that include nuclear options. Even more
dangerous, Russian generals might assume that NATO would recognize this imbalance and would
therefore not dare to escalate." Dmitri K. Simes, How Obama is Driving Russia and China
Together, THE NATIONAL INTEREST (July-August, 2014), http://nationalinterest.org/feature/how-
obama-driving-russia-china-together-1 0735.
181. Supra note 120.
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Third, the U.S. appears to consider Ukraine to be of marginal strategic
importance-as lying within Russia's "sphere of influence."1 8 2 (The U.S.
made a similar calculation when Russia invaded Georgia in 2008.)183 On the
other hand, for Russia, Ukraine is "the single most strategically,
economically, historically and emotionally significant area on [its]
borders."1 8 4 Further, the U.S. is seeking Russia's cooperation on a variety of
fronts, including Syria and Iran. Rather than risk sacrificing Russian
goodwill, the U.S. apparently decided to write off the annexation of Crimea.
Fourth, the U.S. and the U.K. are still war-weary after the Second Gulf
War. The idealism that (arguably) motivated the intervention in Iraq has
given way, as often happens after a war, to disappointment and disillusion.
The current U.S. Administration also firmly intends, for domestic political
reasons, to avoid major engagement in another war. Thus, the U.S. military
intervention in Libya was limited; the U.S. eventually decided not to send
forces into Syria; and even in the critical emergency in Iraq, the U.S.
military response has been muted. Finally, of course, a military
confrontation with Russia could have escalated into a nuclear war. Russia is
not Iraq, and deploying Western troops to prevent the seizure of Crimea
would have been far more dangerous than deploying them to protect
Kuwait. The stakes for Mr. Putin were extraordinarily high, both
domestically and internationally, and it is by no means inconceivable that a
Western intervention on Ukraine's behalf would have led to their use.
To be sure, other European States have powerful interests in deterring
Russia from extending its borders: Poland, the three Baltic States, Romania,
Moldova. But even if these States were willing to co-operate militarily with
Ukraine, they would hardly have been a match for Russia.
Realistically, therefore, neither individual nor collective self-defense
was available as an effective remedy for Russia's illegal acts.
United Nations Action.
In Chapter VII, the Charter also authorizes the Security Council to take
a variety of counter-measures, of progressively greater degrees of violence,
against international aggression."' But those powers cannot be exercised
over the veto of a permanent (P5) member of the Council, one of which of
182. See George Friedman, U.S. Has Unfinished Business in Ukraine & Iraq (June 24, 2014),
http://www.realclearworld.com/articles/2014/06/24/the us has unfinished business in ukraine_
and iraq.html.
183. Cnn Library, 2008 Georgia Russia Conflict Fast Facts, CNN (Mar. 16, 2014 9:16 AM),
http://www.cnn.com/2014/03/13/world/europe/2008-georgia-russia-conflict/
184. Simes, supra note 103.
185. U.N. Charter art. 39, available at
http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter7.shtml.
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course is Russia.1 8 6 Russia exercised its veto to block even the mild
condemnation in the draft resolution on Crimea tabled by the US. It would
obviously oppose anything stronger. Faced with aggression by a P5
member, the Council is powerless.
The General Assembly did pass a resolution on Crimea. But the
Assembly has no legal power neither to deploy military forces or to
authorize their deployment. It is also powerless in the face of international
aggression.
Judicial remedies
Criminal prosecution
Could a criminal prosecution of President Putin on a charge of
aggression be a remedy? There are at least two possible forms one might
envisage: a prosecution under the Rome Statute and a prosecution in a
national court in a State that asserted universal jurisdiction over the
international crime of aggression. But, again, both the legal and non-legal
obstacles are, realistically, insuperable.
Practical obstacles
First, as a purely practical matter, Russia is obviously far too powerful
to allow either the International Criminal Court (ICC) or any national
prosecutor to arrest its sitting Head of State and subject him to standing trial
on a criminal charge. Indeed, the very attempt to arrest Putin would be an
international incident that would unquestionably provoke a massive Russian
response. Attacks on heads of state (or on other state officials of high rank)
can easily lead to war: the assassination of the heir to the Austro-Hungarian
throne by a Serbian terrorist led, a century ago, to the outbreak of the First
World War. Even efforts to subject the high-ranking officials of powerful
foreign States to the risk of legal liability have been crushed by those
States: U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld warned Belgium in
2003 that the U.S. would force NATO to remove its headquarters from
Brussels unless Belgium repealed a law exposing high-ranking foreign
officials to prosecution for war crimes committed anywhere, and Belgium
repealed its law.18 7
186. See United Nations Security Council, Current Members, available at
http://www.un.org/en/sc/members/.
187. See Amnesty International, Belgium: Universal Jurisdiction Law Repealed (Aug., 2003),
http://www.hrw.org/news/2003/08/01/belgium-universal-jurisdiction-law-repealed. As if to
demonstrate that such laws will be enforced against weaker nations, however, the terms of the
repeal allowed on-going Belgian investigations concerning Rwanda, Guatemala and Chad to
continue.
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Legal objections
Legally, moreover, the objections to prosecuting Mr. Putin on a charge
of criminal aggression, whether before the I.C.C. or a national court, are
also very compelling.
Prosecution under the Rome Statute
A prosecution before the I.C.C. on a charge of aggression under the
Rome Statute simply could not occur. To begin with, Russia has not ratified
the Rome Statute, although it has signed it. As a mere signatory, Russia has
an international legal obligation not to defeat the object and purpose of that
treaty. But Russia's leadership is not legally subject to the ICC's
jurisdiction.
Furthermore, the 2010 Kampala amendments adding the crime of
aggression to the ICC's jurisdiction are not yet in effect. By their own
terms, these amendments only come into effect one year after they have
been ratified by thirty State parties; and only fourteen States (not including
Russia) have ratified the amendments thus far."'
It is true that in 2009 and 2010, the Pre-Trial Chamber of the I.C.C.
issued arrest warrants for President Bashir of Sudan, despite the fact that
Sudan was not a party to the Rome Statute. In that case, however, the I.C.C.
concluded that a prosecution could go forward because the Security Council
in Resolution 1593189 had expressly referred the situation in Darfur (Sudan)
to the I.C.C. prosecutor.1 9 0 Such a referral is of course inconceivable in
188. See Wikipedia, Amendments to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/AmendmentstotheRomeStatuteof-theInternationalCriminal_
Court (Nov. 26, 2014).
189. Under operative ¶ 2 of that Resolution, the Council "[diecides that the Government of
Sudan and all other parties to the conflict in Darfur, shall cooperate fully with and provide any
necessary assistance to the Court and the Prosecutor pursuant to this resolution and, while
recognizing that States not party to the Rome Statute have no obligation under the Statute, urges
all States and concerned regional and other international organizations to cooperate fully."
190. See The Prosecutor vs. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, ICC-02/05-01/09, Warrant of
Arrest for Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir (March 4, 2009), available at http://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc639078.pdf; see also The Prosecutor V. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir,
ICC-02/05-01/09, Second Warrant of Arrest for Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir (July 12, 2010),
available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc907140.pdf In another case, the Prosecutor
was forced to withdraw the prosecution of a different sitting head of State, Kenyan President
Uhuru Kenyatta. This was largely because the Kenyan government's refusal to cooperate-even
though Kenya is a party to the Rome Statute-made it impossible for the prosecution to gather
sufficient evidence. See Notice of withdrawal of charges in Prosecutor v. Kenyatta, International
Criminal Court, Trial Chamber, Case No. ICC-01/09-02/11 (Dec. 5, 2014), available at
http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/docl879204.pdf; see also The Editorial Board, The
International Criminal Court on shaky ground, in The Washington Post (Dec. 28, 2014), available
at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-international-criminal-court-on-shaky-
ground/2014/12/28/8d11a3d6-815c-1le4-81fd-8c4814dfa9d7_story.html; Kevin Sieff, I.C.C.
drops charges against Kenyan president after probe into violence, in The Washington Post (Dec.
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Putin's case.
Prosecution in a foreign domestic court
Alternatively, one might raise the question whether Putin could be
prosecuted and tried in a particular national jurisdiction (say, Spain).1 9 1
Recent years have seen a number of attempts to prosecute ranking foreign
State officials for international crimes in national courts. But, as
documented in an excellent "Briefing Paper" by Chatham House, these
attempts "have generally ended in failure."1 9 2 Let us consider why.
Although not involving the prosecution of a foreign official, the House
of Lords' Jones decision illustrates some of the legal pitfalls.19 3 Jones
determined that the criminality of aggression has become established as a
matter of customary international law. But under Jones, no prosecution
could go forward in the U.K. under that charge, because that rule of
customary law had not been codified as domestic criminal law in that
country. Only if a State incorporates customary international law into its
national criminal law either automatically (which the U.K. does not) or by
virtue of an implementing act of its national legislature (which the U.K.
Parliament had not done) would a prosecution based on customary law be
legally possible. National legal systems that were similar in these respects
to the U.K.'s could therefore not provide a forum for prosecuting Putin.
There could also be significant jurisdictional problems in the
prosecution of Mr. Putin in a domestic foreign court. This is so despite the
(purported) emergence of "universal jurisdiction" over certain categories of
offenses. Universal jurisdiction, both criminal and civil, has indeed become
more common in the current legal environment, especially with regard to
certain international crimes, viz., genocide, crimes against humanity and
war crimes.194 But many national systems do not incorporate universal
5, 2014), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/africa/icc-drops-charges-against-
kenyan-president-after-probe-into-violence/2014/12/05/cb8c5538-4a44-46bd-8497-
f298a5a9c8b7_story.html. Of further note, the I.C.C. has rejected a complaint against former
Pope Benedict XVI, who while still serving as Pontiff enjoyed head of state immunity in national
jurisdictions, on the grounds that the alleged offenses lay outside either its temporal jurisdiction or
its subject-matter jurisdiction. See Rachel Zoll, Int'l court case against ex-pope fizzles
(Associated Press, June 13, 2013), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/intl-court-case-against-ex-pope-
fizzles.
191. However, Spanish law on this matter has been reverting to a more traditional position.
See note 205, infra.
192. Joanne Foakes, Chatham House Briefing Paper, Immunity for International Crimes?
Developments in the Law on Prosecuting Heads of State in Foreign Courts (Nov. 2011), available
at
http://www.chathanihouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/public/Research/International%20Law/bp
1111 _foakes.pdf
193. Cite back to Jones, fn. 59.
194. See, e.g., Robert Cryer, Prosecuting International Crimes: Selectivity and the
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jurisdiction or allow for the prosecution of foreign nationals for crimes
against other foreign nationals committed abroad, unless such prosecutions
are specifically authorized by local statutory law. In these systems, there
must be a traditional jurisdictional nexus between the crime and the forum
State: for example, either the defendant must be a national of the forum
State, or a victim of the crime must have been a forum national; or the
crime must have had some link to the forum's territory, or the effects of the
crime must have been felt there.195 An attempted prosecution of Putin under
the customary international law of aggression would be unfeasible in many
jurisdictions for these reasons.
Sitting Head of State immunity
There is yet another, still more formidable legal obstacle to prosecuting
Mr. Putin in a foreign national court: the international legal rule of "Head of
State immunity." Under this rule, foreign Heads of State (and other foreign
government officials of high rank, such as Prime Ministers and Foreign
Ministers) enjoy a broad personal immunity during their tenure of office
from the jurisdiction of foreign domestic courts, including immunity from
being prosecuted for international customary law crimes. "National courts
and prosecutors have consistently rejected cases against sitting heads of
state. "196
The doctrine of (sitting) Head of State immunity is firmly entrenched in
customary international law. The I.C.J. affirmed its continuing vitality in
the (2002) Arrest Warrant Case, saying, in relation to an incumbent Foreign
Minister:
International Criminal Law Regime 84-95 (2003); Donald Francis Donovan & Anthea Roberts,
The Emerging Recognition of Universal Civil Jurisdiction, 100 Am. J. Int'l L. 142 (2006). For
legal justification of this practice in criminal cases, see. e.g., Georg Schwarzenberger, The
Eichmann Judgment: An Essay in Censorial Jurisprudence, 15 Current Legal Probs. 248, 256
(1962) ("It would ... be hard to point to evidence of a rule of international law prohibiting the
assumption of [national] criminal jurisdiction against an accused actually present in the territory of
a sovereign State for crimes he is accused of having committed against foreign nationals
abroad.... In particular, this applies if other States with as close a link, or an even closer link,
with the crimes committed, are not able or willing to shoulder the task.")..
195. The last of these jurisdictional linkages, known as the principle of objective territoriality,
was traditionally the most problematic. Even then, however, there was judicial support for it.
Thus, the PCIJ's decision in The Case ofS.S. Lotus (France v. Turkey), (1927) P.C.I.J. Ser. A, No
10, available at http://www.worldcourts.com/pcij/eng/decisions/1927.09.07_lotus.htm, stated that
"offences, the authors of which at the moment of commission are in the territory of another State,
are nevertheless to be regarded as having been committed in the national territory, if one of the
constituent elements of the offence, and more especially its effects, have taken place there. For a
thorough review of the English historical precedents (which embraced, albeit hesitatingly and only
in some cases, objective territoriality jurisdiction), see Libman v. The Queen, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 178
at ¶¶ 13-27.
196. Ingrid Wuerth, Pinochet's Legacy Reassessed, 106 AM. J. INT'L L. 731, 741 (2012).
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[T]hroughout the duration of his or her office, he or she when
abroad enjoys full immunity from criminal jurisdiction and
inviolability... In this respect, no distinction can be drawn between
acts performed by a Minister for Foreign Affairs in an "official"
capacity, and those claimed to have been performed in a "private
capacity," or, for that matter, between acts performed before the
person concerned assumed office . .. and acts committed during the
period of office.19 7
Likewise, the French Cour de Cassation ruled in the 2001 Ghaddafi
Case, that Colonel Mouammar Ghaddafi, then the serving Head of State of
Libya, enjoyed immunity against criminal prosecution for his alleged
complicity in acts of terrorism that included the murder of French nationals
and the destruction of a civilian passenger aircraft.19 8
Recently, on January 14, 2014, a Chamber of the European Court of
Human Rights (ECHR) affirmed the general rule of Head of State immunity
and applied the rule to a case brought in the U.K. in which private plaintiffs
in a civil action sought relief from alleged acts of torture committed by
officials of Saudi Arabia acting on behalf of the Saudi government.1 9 9 The
ECHR Chamber said (at T 204) that "[t]he weight of authority at
international and national level . .. appears to support the proposition that
State immunity in principle offers individual employees or officers of a
foreign State protection in respect of acts undertaken on behalf of the State
under the same cloak as protects the State itself."2 0 0 Moreover, the ECHR
Chamber ruled (at TT 213, 215) that this immunity was not abrogated
because the defendants in the case were alleged to have committed acts of
torture, which concededly is an egregious offense under international law:
[W]hile there is in the Court's view some emerging support in
favour of a special rule or exception in public international law in
cases concerning civil claims for torture lodged against foreign
State officials, the bulk of the authority is . . . to the effect that the
197. Arrest Warrant Case of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium),
I.C.J Reports 3 at ¶¶ 54-55.I.C.J.
198. Arrt relative aux pursuits engagdes contre le colonel Kadhaffi, Cour de Cassation
(March 13, 2001), Arrt no. 1414. For a critique of the Court's reasoning, see Salvatore
Zappala, Do Heads of State in Office Enjoy Immunity from Jurisdiction for International Crimes?
The Ghaddafi Case Before the French Cour de Cassation, 12 EUR. J. INT'L L. 595 (2001).
199. Jones v. UK, European Court of Human Rights, Nos. 34356/06 and 40528/06) (Jan. 14,
2014),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx#{"appno ":["34356/06"], "itemid":["001-
140005 "}.
200. Id. at T 204.
No. 1] 177
178 UNIV OF ST THOMAS JOURNAL OFLAW& PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. IX
State's right to immunity may not be circumvented by suing its
servants or agents instead. Taking the applicants' arguments at their
strongest, there is evidence of recent debate surrounding the
understanding of the definition of torture in the Convention against
Torture; the interaction between State immunity and the rules on
attribution in the Draft Articles on State Responsibility; and the
scope of Article 14 of the Convention against Torture....
However, State practice on the question is in a state of flux, with
evidence of both the grant and the refusal of immunity ratione
materiae in such cases.... International opinion on the question
may be said to be beginning to evolve, as demonstrated recently by
the discussions around the work of the International Law
Commission in the criminal sphere. This work is ongoing and
further developments can be expected.... In these circumstances,
the Court is satisfied that the grant of immunity to the State
officials in the present case reflected generally recognised rules of
public international law.20 1
The ECHR Chamber's decision may be appealed to the Grand
Chamber, and the opinion itself makes clear that international opinion on
the question of immunity for acts such as torture is "beginning to evolve."2 0 2
Moreover, the holding applies to a civil action, not a criminal case.
Nonetheless, it reinforces the conclusion that a sitting Head of State like
Putin could not be prosecuted criminally (nor sued civilly) in a foreign
domestic court.
Former Head of State immunity.
There is precedent permitting the criminal prosecution of a former Head
of State for grave international crimes, most importantly the U.K. House of
Lords Pinochet decision. 203 But in general, national courts and prosecutors
have extended "functional" immunity to former heads of State (and other
high ranking officials).2 0 4 ("Functional" immunity is immunity for public
201. Id. at TT 213, 215.
202. Id.
203. See Regina v. Bow Street Magistrates Court ex parte Pinochet, No. 3 [2000] AC 147.
204. This is suggested by language in paragraph 61 of the I.C.J.'s Arrest Warrant Case,
supra.
after a person ceases to hold the office of Minister for Foreign Affairs, he or she will no longer
enjoy all of the immunities accorded by international law in other States. Provided that it has
jurisdiction under international law, a court of one State may try a former Minister for Foreign
Affairs of another State in respect of acts committed prior or subsequent to his or her period of
office, as well as in respect of acts committed during that period of office in a private capacity.
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acts performed while in office.) For example, a group of international
human rights organizations filed a complaint in 2007 in France against
former U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld for acts of torture (an
international crime). The Paris Prosecutor declined to prosecute the case,
saying:
The services of the [French] Ministry of Foreign Affairs indicated
that in application of the rules of customary international law
established by the International Court of Justice, immunity from
criminal jurisdiction for Heads of State and Government and
Ministers of Foreign Affairs continues to apply after termination of
their functions, for acts carried out during their time of office and
hence, as former Secretary of Defense, Mr. Rumsfeld, by extension
should benefit from this same immunity for acts carried out in the
exercise of his functions.2 0 5
We should note, however, that a few national systems do permit
prosecutions to be brought against former governmental leaders for certain
violations of international law. "There have been relatively few cases, but
Spain has continued to lead the way with the issue of arrest warrants in
respect of several former heads of state, including two former presidents of
Guatemala, Rios Montt and Oscar Mejia Victores, for genocide, torture and
other related crimes." 2 0 6
See also Wuerth, supra note 113 at 741.I.C.J.
205. See Center for Constitutional Rights, France in Violation of Law Grants Donald
Rumsfeld Immunity, Dismisses Torture Complaint (Nov. 26, 2007),
http://www.ccrjustice.org/newsroom/press-releases/france-violation-law-grants-donald-rumsfeld-
immunity,-dismisses-torture-comp.
206. Foakes, supra note 110. In 2005, the Constitutional Court of Spain affirmed the
universal jurisdiction of Spanish courts with respect to certain especially heinous international
crimes in a case charging that the former Guatemalan head of state, Efrain Rios-Montt, had
committed genocide and other crimes. See Constitutional Court Judgment No. 23.2005 (Sept. 26,
2005), English trans. available at
http://www.tribunalconstitucional.es/en/jurisprudencia/restrad/Pages/JCC2372005.aspx. Since
then, however, the Spanish legislature has twice amended the relevant jurisdictional statute, in
2009 and again in 2014. For the most recent amendments, see Ley Org6nica 1/2014, de 13 de
marzo, de modificacion de la Ley Org6nica 6/1985, de 1 dejulio, del Poder Judicial, relativa a la
justicia universal, available at http://www.boe.es/boe/dias/2014/03/14/pdfs/BOE-A-2014-
2709.pdf. These amendments have severely limited the previously "universal" jurisdiction
asserted by the Spanish courts. For a brief review of the political and diplomatic controversies
causing Spain to limit its judiciary's jurisdiction, see Joseph Klinger, Spain's Not-Fully-Universal
"Universal Jurisdiction" Statute Still Causing Diplomatic Headaches, Harvard Journal of
International Law On-Line (Dec. 4, 2013), available at http://www.harvardilj.org/2013/12/spains-
not-fully-universal-universal-jurisdiction-statute-still-causing-diplomatic-headaches/; see also
Jim Yardley, Spain Seeks to Curb Law Allowing Judges to Pursue Cases Globally, in The New
York Times (Feb. 10, 2014), available at
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At most, therefore, Mr. Putin might be subject to criminal prosecution
for acts of aggression in an (outlier) jurisdiction like Spain, but only after he
leaves office-and perhaps not even then.
Litigation in the I. C.J
Over the decades, organs of the United Nations, joined by jurists and
legal scholars, have expressed the hope that the I.C.J. would serve as a
powerful instrument for achieving peace through law.2 0 7 And these lectures
have often referred to I.C.J. decisions clarifying international use of force
rules, including the decisions in Congo2 0 8 , Oil Platforms,2 0 9 Nicaragua v.
U.S.,2 1 0 and Corfu Channel.2 1 1 Could Ukraine bring suit against Russia in
the I.C.J. and, if so, what relief might a favorable judgment afford?
Contentious Cases
It is very doubtful that Ukraine could bring a suit against Russia in the
I.C.J. or obtain meaningful relief from it.
I.C.J. decisions are of two kinds: contentious cases and advisory
opinions. Were Ukraine to seek to bring suit directly against Russia, that
litigation would fall in the category of contentious cases.
Only States may institute contentious cases before the I.C.J., and only
States may be sued.2 1 2 It is a bedrock principle of the I.C.J.'s jurisprudence
that a State can be sued only with its consent. This principle is an aspect or
consequence of the idea of State sovereignty.
In general, a State's consent to be sued can be given through a "special
agreement" or "compromis. " Alternatively and more often, the Court can
decide disputes between States with binding force (i.e., its "compulsory
jurisdiction" arises) on the basis of treaties in which jurisdiction over
disputes between the parties is conferred on the Court (I.C.J. Statute Art.
36(1)) or on the basis of the "optional clause" which provides that States
"may at any time declare that they recognize as compulsory ipso facto and
without special agreement, in relation to any other State accepting the same
obligation, the jurisdiction of the Court... ."213 The Court enforces these
jurisdictional prerequisites stringently, often dividing contentious cases into
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/1 1/world/europe/spanish-legislators-seek-new-limits-on-
universal-jurisdiction-law.html?_r=0.
207. See Aloysius P. Llamzon, Jurisdiction and Compliance in Recent Decisions of the
International Court ofJustice, 18 EUR. J. INT'L L.815, 815-16 (2007).
208. Supra note 39.
209. Supra note 48.
210. Supra note 28.
211. Supra note 96.
212. I.C.J. Acts & Does. 34(1).
213. Id. at 36(2).
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a jurisdictional phase and, when appropriate, a merits phase.
Together with all the other P5 powers (except the U.K.), Russia has
rejected the compulsory jurisdiction of the I.C.J..214 So have most other
U.N. Member States. "States are generally reluctant to settle international
conflicts by means of the I.C.J.. This is especially the case with politically
important issues. "215 Thus, where one State seeks a merits decision in the
I.C.J. in a dispute with another State over the latter's use of force, the suing
State will be all but forced to argue that the Court has jurisdiction based on
a "compromissory clause" in a bilateral or multilateral treaty to which both
it and the intended defendant are State parties.2 16
Compromissory clauses are found in many treaties, and typically confer
jurisdiction to resolve a dispute over the interpretation or application of the
treaty upon the I.C.J.. Sometimes, however, the compromissory clause will
provide for a referral of the dispute on the I.C.J. only after other efforts to
settle the dispute have failed. For instance, Article 32(2) of the United
Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and
Psychotropic Substances provides for mediation and other dispute-
resolution options, but also states that "[a]ny such dispute which cannot be
settled . . . shall be referred, at the request of any one of the States Parties to
the dispute, to the International Court of Justice for decision."2 1 7 As we
shall soon see, the contingency of a referral to the I.C.J. may be decisive in
preventing the Court from taking jurisdiction.
Unfortunately for plaintiff States seeking judicial relief for another
State's acts of aggression, there may well be no compromissory clause in a
treaty relating to armed conflict to which it and the intended defendant State
are both parties. In practice, therefore, States seek to bring suit on the basis
of "compromissory" clauses in treaties that are primarily dedicated to other
matters of concern to both the plaintiff and defendant State, and in which
the use of force is only a peripheral concern. In other words, plaintiff States
seek to find a jurisdictional "hook" in a treaty unrelated to the use of force
that will enable them to bring the intended defendant before the Court, in
the hopes that the Court will then address the merits of the use of force
questions that are the true substance of the dispute.
The I.C.J. will sometimes fall in line with this strategy, finding that
214. Id. at 817 n.12, 850 n.240.
215. Onuma Yasuaki, Is the International Court of Justice an Emperor Without Clothes?, 8
Int'l Legal Theory 1, 13 (2002).
216. I.C.J. jurisdiction could also arise under Article 36(1) through a "special agreement"
under which the State disputants expressly agreed to the Court's resolution of their dispute.
"Relatively few cases are ever instituted through Special Agreement." Llamzon, supra note 121,
at 818. Russia would obviously be most unlikely to give such express consent here.I.C.J.
217. United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic
Substances, Dec. 20, 1988, 1582 U.N.T.S. 164, 28 I.L.M. 493 art. 2, para. 2.(1989).
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jurisdiction exists under Art. 36(1) of its Statute and the relevant
compromissory clause, and then going on to decide the merits of the
disputes over the use of force despite the fact that they are peripheral to the
jurisdiction-conferring treaty. For example, in the 1996 Oil Platform case,
Iran successfully invoked a compulsory jurisdiction clause in its 1955
Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation with the United States to
get its dispute over the U.S.' use of force before the Court, even though the
U.S. argued that that treaty was unrelated to Iran's use of force claims
against its use of force.218
Could Ukraine sue Russia on the basis of a treaty to which both were
parties and which included a compulsory jurisdiction clause and so have its
claims against Russia decided on the merits, even if the subject matter of
the treaty with Russia was largely unrelated to the use of force? Georgia
tried such a strategy in its attempt to have the I.C.J. adjudicate its use of
force claims against Russia for Russia's invasion of Georgia in 2008. The
I.C.J. rejected Georgia's jurisdictional argument, and it seems to me
unlikely that Ukraine would fare any better.
Georgia filed suit against Russia on the basis of Russia's alleged
violations of the rights of ethnic Georgians under Articles 2 and 5 of the
1965 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination (CERD), which both Russia and Georgia had ratified.219
Plainly, these clauses of the CERD were not primarily directed to State
parties' conduct of wartime operations. However, Article 22 of the CERD
was a jurisdictional provision that referred any "dispute" between the
parties over the interpretation or application of the CERD to the I.C.J. if
that dispute "is not settled by negotiation or by the procedures expressly
provided in" the CERD.220 Georgia alleged that its disagreements with
Russia over the legality of Russia's conduct in the invasion included a
"dispute" over CERD's "interpretation or application" that had not been
"settled by negotiation" and could thus be referred to the Court even over
Russia's protest. The I.C.J. rejected this argument, finding that Georgia had
not attempted to settle the dispute by prior "negotiation." The Court's
reasoning was highly formalistic.22 1 In essence, however, the I.C.J. seemed
to be saying that it would not let itself be manipulated into deciding the
merits of major legal disputes over the use of force on the basis of
218. Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America), Preliminary
Objection, Judgment, IC.J. Reports 1996, p. 803 at ¶ 21.
219. See Case Concerning Application of International Convention on Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination, Req. for the Indication of Provisional Measures Order of Oct. 15,
2008 (Geor. v. Russ.), 47 I.L.M. 1013 (Oct. 15).
220. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 660
U.N.T.S. 195, 5 I.L.M. 352, Art. 22.
221. See Okawa, supra.
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compulsory jurisdiction clauses in treaties to which such disputes are
peripheral.
Viewing Oil Platforms and Georgia together, we must feel some
uncertainty. It is simply unclear whether there is a treaty between Russia
and Ukraine that 1) includes a compulsory jurisdiction clause that permits a
referral to the I.C.J. of 2) a dispute between the two States over use of force
issues 3) but without a prerequisite to that referral that the Court would
conclude had not been satisfied.
Finally, even if Ukraine somehow managed to persuade the I.C.J. to
assume jurisdiction in a suit against Russia and to find Russia in violation
of the jus ad bellum, what substantive relief could the Court provide?
Russia could simply refuse to comply with any I.C.J. Order that provided
Ukraine with substantive relief. The U.N. Charter addresses the possibility
of non-compliance with an I.C.J. 222 That Article provides that
[i]f any party to a case fails to perform the obligations incumbent
upon it under a judgment rendered by the Court, the other party
may have recourse to the Security Council, which may, if it deems
necessary, make recommendations or decide upon measures to be
taken to give effect to the judgment.2 2 3
Obviously, reliance on the Security Council to bring a P5 Member like
Russia into compliance would be futile. Indeed, even without a Russian
veto, the Security Council, in its discretion, might simply decide not to act
on Ukraine's request for enforcement.
I. C.J. Advisory Opinions
Alternatively, Ukraine might seek to have the I.C.J. declare Russia's
conduct to have been illegal by means of an "advisory opinion" from the
Court. The I.C.J. has addressed important war-related issues in opinions of
this kind as well as in contentious cases: two notable instances are its
opinions in the Wall Case2 2 4 (on the legality of the barrier Israel constructed
in part of the territories under its belligerent occupation) and in the Nuclear
Weapons Case (on the legality of the use or threat of use of nuclear
weapons).
But here too Ukraine would encounter substantial legal difficulties in
obtaining substantive relief. First, Ukraine cannot obtain an I.C.J. advisory
opinion on its own. The I.C.J. will render advisory opinions only at the
222. I.C.J. Acts & Docs. 94(2).
223. Id.
224. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,
Advisory Op., 2004 LC.J 136, (Jun. 9).I.C.J.
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request of organs of the United Nations (and not all of those). Most likely,
Ukraine would have to persuade a majority of the General Assembly to
seek such an opinion from the Court. (Both the Wall Case and the Nuclear
Weapons Case were advisory opinions rendered at the General Assembly's
request.) And persuading the General Assembly would not necessarily be
easy. Second, an advisory opinion is not legally binding; only a decision in
a contentious case is. Ukraine's "relief' would consist, at most, in the
I.C.J.'s declaration that Russia's conduct had been illegal and that Russia
was therefore under an obligation to take certain measures, possibly
including reparation.2 2 5 While an I.C.J. declaration of Russia's legal
liabilities could provide Ukraine with useful leverage in future bargaining
with Russia, the declaration is obviously not self-executing. Third, even if
the General Assembly requested an advisory opinion, the I.C.J. has the
discretion to decline that request (though such a refusal would be
unlikely). 2 6
I conclude, then, that Ukraine would be unlikely to receive meaningful
relief from the I.C.J. either in a contentious case or even through an
advisory opinion.
Litigation in the European Court ofHuman Rights
In light of a recent precedent decided on May 12, 2014, by the Grand
Chamber of the ECHR, the most promising form of judicial relief available
to Ukraine may lie in a demand before that forum "just satisfaction" of the
damages caused by the Russian intervention.2 2 7
The ECHR Grand Chamber decision in question is Cyprus v. Turkey.2 2 8
The case arose out of Turkey's invasion of Cyprus in 1974, and its
subsequent de facto annexation of the ethnically Turkish, northern part of
that island.2 2 9 In a Grand Chamber judgment of May, 2001, the ECHR had
found that Turkey had committed numerous violations of the European
Convention on Human Rights arising out of the invasion and annexation.2 3 0
At that time, however, the Court ruled that consideration of the issue of just
225. Id. at ¶¶ 149-52.
226. Id. at ¶ 44. See Nuclear Weapons Case, supra note 35 at ¶ 14.
227. Note that Ukraine filed an application for interim measures against Russia with the
ECHR in March, 2014. See Antoine Buyse, Ukraine - Russia Inter-State Application Guest Post,
ECHR Blog (March 24, 2014, 2:21 PM), http://echrblog.blogspot.com/2014/03/ukraine-russia-
inter-state-application.html. Ukraine has also notified the ECHR that it intends to file an inter-
state complaint against Russia. See Tina Burjaliani, The Price of Human Rights Violations during
War and Occupation, Tabula (June 10, 2014, 2:33 PM), http://www.tabula.ge/en/story/84254-the-
price-of-human-rights-violations-during-war-and-occupation.
228. Amirov v. Russia (No. 257891/94), (May 12, 2014), Eur. Ct. H.R., available at
http:/ihudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-144151 #{"itemid":["001-144151"]}.
229. Id.
230. Id.
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satisfaction was untimely.2 3 1 In 2007, Cyprus notified the Court that it
intended to resubmit the question of just satisfaction and, in 2010, it did so,
asking for just satisfaction for the missing persons as to whom the Court
had previously found Turkish violations.2 3 2 (These included violations of
the rights to life, liberty and security and of the prohibition on torture or
degrading treatment.) Cyprus sought compensation for these injuries, not on
behalf of the State itself, but for the benefit of the individual victims or their
relatives.2 3 3 In May of this year, the Grand Chamber held that the passage of
time since the principal judgment of 2001 did not preclude it from
considering Cyprus' claim. It ruled that Turkey was to pay a total of 90
million to Cyprus in just satisfaction.2 3 4
Some legal scholars see Cyprus v. Turkey as a precedent for a similar
lawsuit by Ukraine against Russia before the ECHR for violations of the
European Convention on Human Rights.2 3 5 They may well be right, since
the factual pattern of the Russian invasion of 2014 corresponds in some
respects to that of the Turkish invasion of 2014. To my knowledge,
however, Russia, unlike Turkey, caused no mass displacements of the local
population, nor have large numbers of the inhabitants gone missing, nor did
Russia seize private property.2 3 6
Note the severe limitations in this approach, however. First, the relief
ordered was only monetary. The Court did not order an end to Turkey's
presence in northern Cyprus (30,000 Turkish troops remain stationed there)
nor the restoration of the Turkish-administered territory to Cyprus'
sovereignty.2 3 7 Responsibility for the execution of the Court's 2001
judgment against Turkey still lies with an executive body, the EU
Committee of Ministers, under Article 46 of the European Convention.
Second, although the overall amount awarded was substantial, recovery
went to individuals and families, not to the State of Cyprus.2 3 8 (Each
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Cyprus v. Turkey, App. No. 25781/94 Eur. Ct. H.R. 131 (2001).
235. See, e.g., Thomas D. Grant, Crimea after Cyprus v. Turkey: Just Satisfaction for
Unlawful Annexation?, EJIL Talk! (May 19, 2014), http://www.ejiltalk.org/crimea-after-cyprus-v-
turkey-just-satisfaction-for-unlawful-annexation/; See also Can't get no just satisfaction? The
Cyprus v. Turkey judgment of the European Court ofHuman Rights (May 23, 2014),
http://cjicl.org.uk/2014/05/23/cant-get-just-satisfaction-cyprus-v-turkey-judgment-european-court-
human-rights/.
236. However, individual suits based on alleged abductions and other European Convention
violations have already been filed with the ECHR. See Court in Strasbourg to consider Russian
liability for abduction in Ukraine, Human Rights in Ukraine (March 13, 2014),
http://khpg.org/en/index.php?id=1 394655465.
237. Cyprus,supra note 160.
238. See Can't get no just satisfaction? The Cyprus v. Turkey judgment of the European
Court of Human Rights, CAMBRIDGE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW
(May 23, 2014), http://cjicl.org.uk/2014/05/23/cant-get-just-satisfaction-cyprus-v-turkey-
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individual beneficiary will receive about 20,000 euros.) Third, the
compensation was long delayed. The invasion and division of Cyprus had
occurred forty years ago. The Court had declined to consider just
satisfaction in 2001. The award came thirteen years later. Finally, Turkey's
Foreign Minister has indicated that Turkey will not pay the award.239 (It
appears that Russia does pay compensation ordered by the ECHR.2 4 0)
Bear in mind also that the European Convention on Human Rights is
only a regional treaty. It happens that Russia and Ukraine are both parties to
it,2 4 1 and Ukraine can sue Russia in the ECHR for violating it. Any
precedent adverse to Russia could not be applied to non-European States
that were not subject to that Convention.
"Atoms (bombs) for peace"?
We seem forced to conclude that the international law of armed conflict
does little, perhaps nothing, to help Ukraine, and that it would also do little
or nothing to help other small States in similar confrontations with an
aggressive Great Power. Only if the Great Power in question is willing to
submit to legal processes and to abide by their results will a substantive
judicial remedy be assured. Only if another Great Power rallies to its aid
will its right of self-defense be meaningful.
What should Ukraine have done? The answer, I think, is plain: it should
not have given up its nuclear arsenal under the Budapest memorandums of
1994. (The International Relations scholar John Mearsheimer argued that at
the time. 2 4 2 ) Under that agreement, Ukraine relinquished the nuclear
capability it had inherited from the former Soviet Union and agreed to join
the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty. But Ukraine did not receive a
promise from the U.S. and the U.K., which had persuaded it to take those
steps, that they would defend it in the event of a Russian attack. It took
nothing to the bank except Western goodwill.
Thus, Ukraine stripped itself of its most effective means of self-defense
against Russian aggression. If Ukraine had retained its nuclear capacity,
Russia would probably have been deterred from invading and annexing
Crimea twenty years later. Nuclear weapons are the great equalizer between
judgment-european-court-human-rights/.
239. See Turkey won't pay Cyprus despite decision in Strasbourg, DW (May 13, 2014),
http://www.dw.de/turkey-wont-pay-cyprus-despite-decision-in-strasbourg/a-17631966.
240. See Erik Voeten, A European Court Ordered Turkey to pay 124 million over 1974
Cyprus invasion, THE WASHINGTON POST (May 12, 2014),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2014/05/12/a-european-court-ordered-
turkey-Ito-pay-124-million-over-i 974-cyprus-invasion-how-does-this-matter/.
241. For a list of the parties to the Convention is available at the Council of Europe website,
see generally Council of Europe, http:/ihuman-rights-convention.org/.
242. See John Mearsheimer, The Case for a Ukrainian Nuclear Deterrent, 72 Foreign Aff
50-66 (1993).
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aggressive Great Powers and smaller States. Israel recognized this fact
decades ago. So, after the U.S. intervention in Iraq in 2003, did Iran and
North Korea. Poland and Finland may realize it next, even though Poland is
shielded by the NATO Alliance. And who can say that South Korea or
Vietnam or Saudi Arabia will not, in the years ahead?
This scenario may not be as terrifying as it seems. Paradoxically, it
might even be benign. The International Relations theorist Kenneth Waltz
made the argument in several fascinating papers.2 4 3 He contended that the
progressive spread of nuclear weaponry through the world will make it a
more, not less, peaceful and stable place. He may be right; I leave that for
others to judge.
243. Kenneth Waltz, Nuclear Myths and Political Realities, 84 AMER. POLL SC. REv. 731
(1990); Kenneth Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Better, Adelphi Papers,
Number 171 (1981), https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/waltzl.htm. Contra. Scott D. Sagan,
The Perils of Proliferation: Organization Theory, Deterrence Theory, and the Spread of Nuclear
Weapons, 18 Int'l Sec. 66 (1994). For an empirical study that lends support to Waltz's view, see
Devin T. Hagerty, The Consequences of Nuclear Proliferation: Lessons from South Asia (1998).
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